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RES JUDICATA: SHOULD CALIFORNIA ABANDON
PRIMARY RIGHTS?
I. INTRODUCTION
An automobile accident occurs where one driver is clearly at fault.
The accident victim is hospitalized for injuries, and the car is destroyed.
How many of the victim's "primary rights" have been violated? If the
victim sues the other driver, how many "causes of action" will the victim
have? How many times will the victim be allowed to sue the other driver
in order to collect all of the damages due? Should it matter that the
victim suffered injuries to both person and property in the same occur-
rence? The answers to these questions depend on whether the jurisdic-
tion whose laws govern the suit defines a cause of action for purposes of
res judicata in terms of primary rights, or in terms of the transaction or
occurrence giving rise to the plaintiff's claim.1
California courts analyze a cause of action for purposes of res judi-
1. The following chart shows how a "claim," a "cause of action," and the preclusive
effect of a lawsuit differ in both types of jurisdictions for an auto accident victim who sustains
bodily injury and property damage in the same accident:
Same Transaction Jurisdiction Primary Rights Jurisdiction
An accident victim has An accident victim has
-two claims: bodily injury and property -two claims: bodily injury and
damage; property damage;
-one cause of action because both kinds of -two causes of action because injury to
damage arose out of the same transaction or person and injury to property violate
occurrence. different primary rights.
-Preclusive effect of first suit: If the -Preclusive effect of first suit: If the
plaintiff brings only one claim in the first plaintiff brings only one claim in the
suit, the second claim will be barred by res first suit, the second claim will not be
judicata. barred by res judicata. If the plaintiff
wins the first suit, plaintiff can plead
collateral estoppel regarding the issue of
the defendant's negligence.
Throughout this Comment, "claim" generally refers to the grounds for relief asserted in
the complaint, while "cause of action" generally refers to: (a) with respect to joinder, the
claims that may be joined in the same lawsuit, or (b) with respect to res judicata, any claims
which preclude a second suit. However, the California Code of Civil Procedure requires the
plaintiff's complaint to state "the facts constituting the cause of action in ordinary and concise
language." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.10(a) (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). Thus,
the Author has used the term "cause of action" in the discussions of California pleading and
amendment so that the language in those sections is consistent with the language in California
statutes and case law.
Unfortunately, the terms "claim" and "cause of action" are often used interchangeably.
Even Black's Law Dictionary treats the terms as synonymous. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
224 (5th ed. 1979). Generally,
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cata according to "primary righti."2 In California and other primary
rights jurisdictions, certain rights are accorded "primary" status; these
rights include the right to be free from injury to person and the right to
be free from injury to property The number of primary rights violated
is significant because it determines the number of causes of action a
plaintiff has in California.4 The victim's primary rights to be free from
personal injury and free from injury to property were violated in the
above-described accident, and the victim therefore has two causes of
action.
The number of causes of action is crucial in determining whether
the victim can file two lawsuits based on the accident. An axiom of res
judicata6 states that a plaintiff must sue on the entire cause of action at
[t]he term "cause of action" is not easily defined, and the authorities have laid
down no thoroughly satisfactory and all embracing definition. It may mean one
thing for one purpose and something different for another, depending on whether a
pleading is good upon demurrer, whether an amendment of pleading is permissible,
or whether the principle of res judicata applies.
1 AM. JUR. 2D Actions § 1 (1962).
In California, "the meaning of 'cause of action' remains elusive and subject to frequent
dispute and misconception," 4 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 24 (3d ed. 1985) (cita-
tions omitted), because the term takes on different meanings in different procedural contexts.
Id.
With respect to federal courts, the problem has been described as follows:
The relationship between the terms "cause of action," "claim," and "demand"
has been somewhat a matter of fashion. The Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] do
not use "cause of action," apparently to avoid the technical meaning of the term at
common law, and speak of "claims for relief" (Rule 8) or "claims" (Rules 13, 18).
The terms are used as alternatives in the Removal Statute ....
The Restatement (Second) [of] Judgments, like the Federal Rules, abandoned
the term "cause of action" and speaks in terms of the dimension of a "claim" for
purposes of merger and bar. Analysis of the res judicata problem in terms of "cause
of action" persists, however, and the term appears in many cases. Thus, sometimes
the cases proceed upon the theory that a single cause of action may be composed of
several claims, or that a single claim can be composed of various legal theories or
demands.
lB J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 0.410[l], n.2 (2d.
ed. 1988) (citations omitted) [hereinafter 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE].
2. 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 23.
3. Comment, Cause of Action Broadened in California, 1 STAN. L. REV. 156, 158 (1948).
4. 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 23. See infra notes 21-171 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the development and application of the primary rights theory in California.
5. Comment, supra note 3, at 158.
6. Res judicata is a judge-made doctrine based on the underlying premise that "[a] party
should not be allowed to relitigate a matter that it already had opportunity to litigate." F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.2, at 589 (3d ed. 1985). The doctrine is based
on two principles. First, a defendant should not be required to defend against the same claim
more than once; second, the state has an interest in bringing an end to litigation. J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.3, at 615 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter M. KANE].
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one time and may not "split" the cause of action.7 The victim in this
example has two distinct causes of action.' Thus, the victim can proceed
against the defendant in two separate suits without "splitting" the cause
of action, and res judicata will not bar the second suit.9 According to the
primary rights theory, the fact that the victim sustained both kinds of
damage in the same transaction or occurrence has no bearing on the
preclusive effect of the first lawsuit. 10
By contrast, in the majority of jurisdictions, primary rights are irrel-
evant. Instead, in the res judicata analysis, the cause of action is cotermi-
nous with the transaction or occurrence that caused the plaintiff's
damage.II In a same transaction or occurrence jurisdiction, the accident
victim in the example above has a single cause of action because the dam-
7. R. CASAD, REs JUDICATA IN A NUTSHELL § 2.1, at 18 (1976).
8. 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 43.
9. Id. § 35, at 77.
10. Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 954, 603 P.2d 58, 72, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 155
(1979); Comment, Res Judicata in California, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 412, 416 (1952).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment a (1981). The Restatement
(Second) of Judgments defines a cause of action for purposes of res judicata as follows:
(1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff's
claim .... the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies
against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of
connected transactions, out of which the action arose.
(2) What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction," and what groupings constitute
a "series," are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations
as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they
form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the
parties' expectations or business understanding or usage.
Id.
See also Comment, Res Judicata and the Common Automobile Accident-The Problem of
Splitting the Cause of Action, 12 ALA. L. REv. 364, 367-68 (1960); Annotation, Simultaneous
Injury to Person and Property as Giving Rise to Single Cause of Action-Modern Cases, 24
A.L.R. 4th 646 (1983). This annotation does not use "primary rights" or "same transaction or
occurrence" language. The analysis therein is limited to lawsuits involving personal injuries
and property damage; it does not discuss other combinations of injuries. However, the annota-
tion divides jurisdictions into those finding one, as opposed to two, causes of action arising
from the auto accident example presented at the beginning of this Comment.
Decisions in the following nine states "support the broad proposition that a wrongful act
or wrongful conduct which causes both personal injuries and property damage to the same
individual infringes different rights and vests in that individual distinct causes of action": Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Virginia.
Id. at 685-86.
By contrast, most jurisdictions emphasize the "causative aspects of a breach of legal
duty." Id. at 650. Consequently, decisions in the following states "support the broad proposi-
tion that a single act which causes simultaneous injury to the physical person and property of
one individual gives rise to only one cause of action": Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
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age resulted from the same "occurrence," even though the victim suf-
fered injury to both person and property. A plaintiff may not relitigate a
cause of action if a valid and final judicial determination was reached in a
prior suit involving the same cause of action. 12 Therefore, under the same
transaction or occurrence definition, the defendant can prevent the plain-
tiff from bringing a second suit on a claim that arose out of the same
transaction or occurrence that gave rise to the first claim.3
For purposes of res judicata, the same transaction definition is supe-
rior to the primary rights definition for two reasons. First, res judicata is
so closely related to pleading, amendment, and joinder that the limita-
tions placed upon these procedures should determine whether a second
suit is precluded by res judicata. Prior to 1971, the rules governing all of
these procedures were based on legal categories. However, the current
rules governing pleading, amendment, and joinder are based on facts,
while the current rules governing res judicata are based on legal catego-
ries. Second, the concept of primary rights is inherently ambiguous.
Any primary right can be defined broadly or narrowly, and no aspect of
the primary rights theory limits the scope of the right. This absence of
guidance has allowed some courts to define a primary right so broadly
that it engulfs the entire occurrence giving rise to the plaintiff's claim.
Under these circumstances, the courts may actually be defining a cause
of action in terms of the same transaction definition without acknowledg-
ing that they are doing so. For these reasons, California should either
require mandatory joinder of plaintiff's claims by statute if those claims
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or join the majority of
jurisdictions by adopting the same transaction definition of a cause of
action.
The inconsistency described above may not, by itself, justify change.
However, the changes in pleading, amendment, and joinder have devel-
oped largely in response to the demands for procedural simplicity 4 and
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. Id. at 653-55.
The trend in federal courts is to use the same transaction definition to determine the
preclusive effect of a suit. 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, V 0.410[1], at 359-
60.
12. M. KANE, supra note 6, § 14.4, at 619-20; Comment, supra note 10, at 413.
13. M. KANE, supra note 6, § 14.4, at 626.
14. The Codes of Civil Procedure were created to correct the problems caused by the
rigidity and complexity of the common-law system. See J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A.
MILLER, & J. SEXTON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 4, § D, at 426-29 (4th
ed. 1985) [hereinafter J. COUND] and authorities cited therein. See also infra notes 172-318
and accompanying text.
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judicial economy."5 The same transaction definition of a cause of action is
easier for lawyers and judges to use, and easier for lay people to under-
stand.16 Additionally, the same transaction definition is more conducive
to judicial economy than the primary rights definition because the same
transaction definition is usually broader, thus requiring litigation of more
claims in a single lawsuit. I1 California's change to the same transaction
definition would contribute to the completion of the task begun by re-
form of related procedures: simplification and streamlining of the judi-
cial process.
This Comment first presents the basic components of primary rights
in California by discussing the ideas of John Norton Pomeroy, the law
professor to whom the creation of the primary rights theory is attributed,
and by discussing how primary rights have been defined and applied by
California courts. Second, the Comment shows how the bases of plead-
ing, amendment, and joinder have evolved from legal categories to facts,
and discusses how the continued use of the primary rights definition of a
cause of action for purposes of res judicata is inconsistent with this devel-
opment. Third, the Comment discusses the inherent ambiguity of the
primary rights theory and the way in which the ambiguity allows Califor-
nia courts to in effect employ the same transaction criteria while techni-
cally adhering to the primary rights theory. The Comment concludes by
suggesting that California should either (1) amend its joinder rules so
that joinder of a plaintiff's claims is mandatory when the claims arise
from the same transaction or occurrence or (2) adopt the same transac-
tion or occurrence definition of a cause of action for purposes of res judi-
cata set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments18 and followed
by a majority of states19 and federal courts.2°
II. PRIMARY RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA
A. Philosophical Underpinnings-The Primary Rights Theory
of John Norton Pomeroy
The origin of the primary rights theory is attributed to Professor
15. See Friedenthal, Joinder of Claims, Counterclaims, and Cross-Complaints: Suggested
Revision of the California Provisions, 23 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1970). See also infra notes 505-
27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship between judicial economy and
the primary rights theory.
16. C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 19, at 137 (2d ed. 1947).
17. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 13.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, § 24.
19. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 12.
20. 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, 0.410[1], at 359.
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John Norton Pomeroy,21 a nineteenth-century scholar whose work sig-
nificantly influenced post-common-law pleading developments.22 At
common law, a plaintiff was required to plead in terms of a limited
number of standardized "forms of action,"'23 and if the plaintiff chose the
incorrect "form," the case was dismissed regardless of the merits. 24 Ad-
ditionally, before the mid-1900s, the law courts and the equity courts
were separate systems; thus, if the plaintiff sought both legal and equita-
ble relief for the same wrong, the plaintiff often had to sue twice in sepa-
rate courts.25 After 1848,26 the forms of action were abolished, 27 and the
law and equity courts were merged. 21 Under the new system, the empha-
sis on the "form" of the action diminished; instead, the plaintiff was re-
quired to allege sufficient facts in his complaint to state a "cause of
action" under any legal theory.29 In the context of these major changes,
Pomeroy thought it imperative to define the term "cause of action" with
exactitude and precision.30
Pomeroy believed that before a cause of action is viable, the plaintiff
must possess a "primary right," and the defendant must owe a corre-
sponding "primary duty.",3 1 The following passage expresses the crux of
the primary fights theory:
Every judicial action must therefore involve the following ele-
ments: a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, and a corre-
sponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant; a delict
or wrong done by the defendant which consisted in a breach of
such primary right and duty; a remedial right in favor of the
plaintiff, and a remedial duty resting on the defendant springing
from this delict, and finally the remedy or relief itself. Every
action, however complicated or however simple, must contain
these essential elements. Of these elements, the primary right
21. 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 23, at 66-67.
22. C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 15, at 78.
23. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 1.4, at 10.
24. Id. See infra notes 172-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the common-law
forms of action.
25. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 1.5, at 16-17.
26. New York's enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1848, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497,
ch. 379, §§ 1-391, initiated major reform of common-law system. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
supra note 6, § 1.6, at 15-16. See infra notes 217-31 and accompanying text.
27. C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 15, at 78.
28. Id.
29. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 3.5.
30. J. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES § 346, at 527 (5th ed. 1929). "To avoid... tendency
to confusion, it is absolutely necessary to ascertain and fix with certainty the true meaning of
the term 'cause of action.'"
31. Id. § 347, at 528.
[Vol. 23:351
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and duty and the delict or wrong combined constitute the cause
of action in the legal sense of the term, and as it is used in the
codes of the several States. They are the legal cause or founda-
tion whence the right of action springs .... 32
Pomeroy developed a system of classification for the rights he
thought were "primary."33 According to Pomeroy, the primary rights
and corresponding primary duties fall into two divisions; the first encom-
passes persons, and the second encompasses things.34
The division concerning persons consists of the rules that define the
status of the person, or, in Pomeroy's words, the rules that determine the
"capacities and incapacities of persons to acquire and enjoy legal rights,
and to be subject to legal duties." 35 Pomeroy noted that in the United
States most class distinctions have been abolished; consequently, the divi-
sion concerning persons is a relatively small part of American
jurisprudence.3 6
Pomeroy separated his division concerning things into two classes:
rights in rem, or "Real" rights, and rights in personam, or "Personal"
rights.37 Real rights are "those which, from their very nature, avail to
their possessor against all mankind, and a correlative duty rests alike
upon every person not to molest, interfere with, or violate the right."38
32. Id. (emphasis added). The right/duty relationship described by Professor Pomeroy
was an essential component of the plaintiff's statement of his cause of action at common law.
In a common-law Declaration (the equivalent of a modem complaint, F. JAMES & G. HAZ-
ARD, supra note 6, § 1.3, at 10), the plaintiff was required to allege: (I) the plaintiff's right;
(2) the defendant's wrongful act which violated that right; and (3) damages. J. KOFFLER & A.
REPPY, COMMON LAW PLEADING § 21, at 86 (1969). The emphasis on the right/duty rela-
tionship changed with the advent of Code pleading. Under the Codes, the plaintiff was not
supposed to focus on allegations of rights and wrongs, for such allegations amounted to con-
clusions of law by the plaintiff. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 3.5. Instead, the
plaintiff was required to plead sufficient facts to state a cause of action under any legal theory,
and the court was to decide which legal theory would apply. Id. See infra notes 217-43 and
accompanying text for further discussion of code pleading.
33. 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 92-95 (4th ed. 1918). Apparently, Pome-
roy did not intend that his categories be construed as a definitive list of primary rights. "Every
command or rule of private civil law creates a primary right in one individual and a primary
duty corresponding thereto .... These rights and duties are, of course, innumerable in their
variety, nature, and extent." Id. § 91.
34. Id. § 92. According to Pomeroy, his divisions "fall by a natural line of separation into
two grand divisions .... " Id.
35. Id. Pomeroy distinguished between the rights governing an individual's capacity to
contract with the rights governing the contract itself. Id. The right of a person to make a
contract would be controlled by the rules concerning persons, while the rights arising from the
contract itself would be controlled by the rules concerning things. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. § 93.
38. Id.
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By contrast, Personal rights "are those which avail to their possessor
against a specified, particular person, or body of persons only, and the
correlative duty not to infringe upon or violate the right rests alone upon
such specified person or body of persons."
39
Pomeroy divided the class of Real rights into three categories. The
first included rights of property over land and chattels. 40 The second
included the rights possessed by every person over his own life, body, and
reputation.4 The third included the rights which certain classes of per-
sons, (namely, husbands, parents, and masters) have over certain other
persons by virtue of domestic relations, (namely, wives, children, ser-
vants and slaves).4' According to Pomeroy, any person who experiences
a violation of a Real right is entitled to redress against any and all viola-
tors, and every member of society has a corresponding duty to refrain
from interfering with the Real rights of others.43
By contrast, Personal rights are not universally owned, and Personal
duties are not universally owed; instead, Personal rights arise as a result
of specific relationships between particular persons.' Pomeroy divided
the class of Personal rights into two categories. The first was comprised
of rights arising from contract. 45 The second consisted of rights that ex-
ist between particular persons by operation of law; these include quasi-
contractual rights and rights that exist between husbands and wives, be-
tween parents and children, between trustees and beneficiaries, and be-
tween debtors and creditors.46
In sum, every person has Real rights against the entire population,
and the entire population has a corresponding duty not to interfere with
those Real rights. By contrast, a Personal right is enforceable only
against particular individuals, and only those individuals owe a duty not
to interfere with those Personal rights.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 94. This class was quite extensive; it included "[r]ights of property of every de-
gree and kind over lands or chattels, things real or things personal." Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. Pomeroy elaborated on the nature of intra-familial property rights:
Thus the husband is, by virtue of this right, entitled to the society of his wife, and the
father is entitled to the services of his infant children, while a duty rests upon every
person not to violate these rights by enticing away, seducing, or injuring the wife or
child. This latter group of rights must not be confounded with those which the hus-
band and wife, parent and child, master and servant, hold against each other, and
which resemble in their nature the rights arising from contract.
Id. These concepts are obviously outmoded.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 95.
45. Id.
46. Id.
[Vol. 23:351
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B. Application of the Primary Rights Theory in California
According to prominent authority, California courts have accorded
"flat acceptance" to Pomeroy's contention that the right/duty relation-
ship defines a cause of action.47 The California courts have adhered to
classification of causes of action by legal categories,48 and the legislature
expressed California's commitment to a category-based cause of action as
early as 1851.49 Such commitment was first reflected in California's for-
mer joinder statute, former Section 427 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure.5 0 That statute set forth separate classes of causes of action
which were based on separate rights."
Thus, California was committed to a category-based cause of action
before Pomeroy published his writings and identified certain rights as
"primary."5 2 Both Pomeroy's categories and the classes set forth in for-
47. 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 24.
48. See Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 750 F.2d 731
(9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985) (applying California law) (no separate rights
to be free from dejure and de facto segregation); McNulty v. Copp, 125 Cal. App. 2d 697, 271
P.2d 90 (1954) (distinguishing causes of action for recovery of real and personal property);
Schermerhorn v. Los Angeles Pac. R.R. Co., 18 Cal. App. 454, 123 P. 351 (1912) (distinguish-
ing causes of action for bodily injury and property damage). See infra notes 99-102 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of NAACP, notes 77-95 and accompanying text for a
discussion of McNulty, and notes 71-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Schermerhorn.
49. 1851 Cal. Stat. 51, 59-60, ch. 5, § 64 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 427 (repealed 1971)). Former Section 427 read as follows:
The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same complaint, when
they all arise out of:
Ist. Contracts, express or implied; or,
2d. Claims to recover specific real property, with or without damages, for the
withholding thereof, or for waste committed thereon, and the rents and profits of the
same; or,
3d. Claims to recover specific personal property, with or without damages, for
the withholding thereof; or,
4th. Claims against a trustee, by virtue of contract, or by operation of law; or,
5th. Injuries to character; or,
6th. Injuries to person; or,
7th. Injuries to property. But the causes of action so united shall all belong to
only one of these classes, and shall affect all parties to the action, and not require
different places of trial, and shall be separately stated.
Id.
50. Holmes v. David Bricker, Inc., 70 Cal. 2d 786, 788, 452 P.2d 647, 649, 76 Cal. Rptr.
431, 433 (1969).
51. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971). See supra note 49 for the text of former
Section 427.
Often, claims held to be violations of separate primary rights also constituted separate
causes of action that could not be joined under California's former joinder statute, CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971). See Comment, supra note 3, at 158.
52. Pomeroy studied the code extensively. See generally J. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES,
supra note 30. Former Section 427 was enacted in 1851, 1851 Cal. Stat. 51, 59-60, ch. 5, § 64,
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mer Section 427 can be traced to the common-law forms of action. 53
Thus, Section 427's classes and Pomeroy's categories were very similar,
although not identical.5 4 Eventually former Section 427 was assumed to
embody the primary rights5" perhaps because many courts cited Pome-
roy's definition of a cause of action,56 thereby adopting the name he gave
to basic rights. Over time, some California courts departed from the
joinder statute categories and made independent decisions regarding
which rights were "primary. '5 7
Under the primary rights theory, a plaintiff may bring multiple suits
for injuries suffered in a single event if those injuries violate separate
primary rights. 58 By contrast, if the injuries violate the same primary
right, only one suit is allowed.59 The courts have identified separate pri-
mary rights,6" distinguished primary rights from theories of
(codified as amended at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971), and the first edition of
Code Remedies was published in 1875. Id., Preface, at xii.
53. J. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES, supra note 30, §§ 45-46; Friedenthal, supra note 15, at2-3. See generally J. KOEFLER & A. REPPY, supra note 32, §§ 8-13, for a discussion of the
development and classification of the "forms of action."
54. Under former Section 427, separate causes of action existed for the recovery of realproperty and the recovery of personal property. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed
1971). See infra notes 255-99 for a discussion of the statute. By contrast, Pomeroy did notdistinguish between rights grounded in real and personal property. 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 33, § 94.
55. Holmes, 70 Cal. 2d at 788, 452 P.2d at 649, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
56. See 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 23 and cases cited therein.
57. See, e.g., NAACP, 750 F.2d at 738 (court found primary right to an equal opportunity
for education); R & A Vending Servs. v. City of Los Angeles, 172 Cal. App. 3d 1188, 1194,218 Cal. Rptr. 667, 670 (1985) (plaintiff argued that since he was "highest responsible bidder,"
he had primary right to be chosen by city as vendor, but court decided that case law estab-lished city's discretion to reject him); see infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text for a
discussion of NAACP and notes 103-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of R & A.
The inherent ambiguity of the primary rights theory may be partially attributable to thefact that no fixed standard exists by which to judge whether a right is "primary." C. CLARK,
supra note 16, § 19, at 135-36 & n.163. See infra notes 332-490 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the ambiguity of the primary rights theory.
58. 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 43.
59. See, eg., NAACP, 750 F.2d at 738 (de facto and de jure segregation of school systemviolate only one primary right to attend integrated schools); Panos v. Great W. Packing Co.,21 Cal. 2d 636, 638, 134 P.2d 242, 244 (1943) (plaintiff who sustained one injury as result of
alleged multiple negligent acts had only one cause of action); see infra notes 99-102 and ac-companying text for a discussion of NAACP and notes 149-57 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Panos.
60. See, e.g., McNulty, 125 Cal. App. 2d at 708-09, 271 P. 2d at 98 (distinguishing between
rights grounded in wrongful possession of real property and wrongful possession of personalproperty); Schermerhorn, 18 Cal. App. at 456, 123 P. at 352 (recognizing distinct rightsgrounded in personal injury and property damage); see infra notes 79-95 and accompanying
text for a discussion of McNulty, and notes 71-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Schermerhorn.
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recovery, 6 and distinguished primary rights from remedies.6 2
1. Recognized separate rights
The initial step in the primary rights analysis is the identification of
rights which are "primary." Separate primary rights recognized in Cali-
fornia include the right to be secure in one's person,63 the right to be
secure in one's property," the right to recover real property,65 the right
to recover personal property,66 the right to equal opportunity for educa-
tion,67 and others.68
a. bodily injury and property damage
California courts recognize violations of separate primary rights
when an accident victim suffers simultaneous injury to his person and to
his property.69 Consequently, the plaintiff is allowed to sue for bodily
injury and property damage in separate lawsuits without incurring the
penalty of res judicata.70
For example, in Schermerhorn v. Los Angeles Pac. R.R. Co.,7 1 the
plaintiff suffered both bodily injury and property damage when the auto-
mobile in which he was a passenger collided with defendant's railroad
car. 72 The plaintiff brought the first suit for property damage and ob-
tained a judgment for $700."3 His second suit for personal injuries was
61. See, e.g., Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 795, 543 P.2d 593, 594-95, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 226-27 (1975) (statutory violation and negligence are separate theories of recovery
through which plaintiff can enforce single primary right to be free from injury to person); Ford
Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 676, 679, 110 Cal. Rptr. 59, 61 (1973) (violation
of state and federal anti-trust statutes constitutes violation of single primary right to be free
from unfair competition); see infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Slater and notes 137-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ford.
62. See, eg., Verdier v. Verdier, 203 Cal. App. 2d 724, 737-38, 22 Cal. Rptr. 93, 102
(1962) (spouse who alleged adultery and extreme cruelty as separate grounds for divorce had
two causes of action even though he sought only one divorce); see infra notes 160-70 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Verdier.
63. Holmes, 70 Cal. 2d at 788-89, 452 P.2d at 649, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
64. Id.
65. McNulty, 125 Cal. App. 2d at 708-09, 271 P.2d at 97.
66. Id.
67. NAACP, 750 F.2d at 738.
68. Presenting an exhaustive list of the primary rights recognized in California is beyond
the scope of this Comment. See generally 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, §§ 23-53, at 66-93 for a
collection of cases dealing with primary rights issues.
69. Schermerhorn, 18 Cal. App. at 456, 123 P. at 352.
70. Id.; Comment, supra note 10, at 414-45.
71. 18 Cal. App. 454, 123 P. 351 (1912).
72. Id. at 455, 123 P. at 352.
73. Id.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
tried after judgment had been rendered in the first suit, and the jury
awarded the plaintiff $600 in the second suit.74 On appeal, the defendant
argued that a plaintiff could not bring separate suits to recover damages
to person and property resulting from the "same tortious act."75 How-
ever, the court recognized that the separate injuries to the plaintiff's per-
son and property gave rise to separate causes of action.76
b. recovery of real property and recovery of personal property
California also recognizes that the primary right to recover real
property is distinct from the primary right to recover personal prop-
erty.7 7 Thus, an original suit grounded in wrongful possession of real
property will not preclude a second suit alleging wrongful possession of
personal property even though: (1) the personal property is located on
the real property that was the subject of the first suit; and (2) the wrong-
ful detention of the real and the personal property arises out of the same
event.78
The distinction between personal and real property rights was illus-
trated in McNulty v. Copp.79 The McNulty case involved a will contest
between two daughters.80 The father willed his real property to one
daughter, Eldridge.81 After he died, the other daughter, Ahern, filed an
action (the original action) contesting the will.82 Eldridge asserted fraud
as a defense, and cross-complained for cancellation of the deed and to
quiet title.83 The trial court entered judgment for Eldridge.84
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 456, 123 P. at 352. The Schermerhorn court did not use "primary rights" lan-
guage to justify its refusal to apply resjudicata. Rather, the court relied on the separate classes
of causes of action, set forth in the former joinder statute, to show that the plaintiff had sepa-
rate causes of action. Id. See infra notes 255-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of
California's former joinder statute, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971). Neverthe-
less, Schermerhorn has been cited to show that injuries to person and injuries to property
constitute violations of separate primary rights. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 10, at 416
n.32.
77. McNulty, 125 Cal. App. 2d at 707-08, 271 P. at 97.
78. Id.
79. 125 Cal. App. 2d 697, 271 P.2d 90 (1954).
80. Id. at 700, 271 P.2d at 93.
81. Id.
82. Id. Within hours of her father's death, Ahem recorded an earlier deed that purport-
edly conveyed the real property to herself. Id. The trial court found that Ahern fraudulently
obtained her father's signature on the deed; her father was nearly blind and depended on
Ahern to read to him. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Eldridge filed two subsequent suits against Ahern." In the first of
these actions (the real property action), Eldridge sought an accounting
and damages for Ahern's use and possession of the real property that was
the subject of the original action.86 In the second action, Eldridge sought
to recover personal property inside the residence and damages for the
wrongful detention of personal property.87 Ahem pleaded res judicata to
both of Eldridge's actions,88 but her res judicata defense succeeded only
in the real property action.89
In the real property action, the court held that Eldridge could not
treat wrongful possession of real property and withholding of possession
of the same real property "as two separate acts or as a violation of two
primary rights."90 Rather, possession of the real property under a false
claim of right gave rise to both the original action and the second real
property action. 91 Thus, allowing the second suit would amount to al-
lowing Eldridge to split her cause of action, and the second real property
action was barred by res judicata.92
By contrast, the court held that res judicata did not bar the personal
property action.93 The court found that the wrongful possession of real
property violated a different primary right than the right violated when
personal property is wrongfully detained.94 The court stated that the
doctrine of res judicata would be "needless[ly] and unsound[ly] ex-
ten[ded]" if a plaintiff were required to unite actions involving separate
primary rights.95
85. Id. at 701, 271 P.2d at 93.
86. Id. at 699, 271 P.2d at 92.
87. Id. at 699-700, 271 P.2d at 92.
88. Id. at 701, 271 P.2d at 93.
89. Id. at 707, 271 P.2d at 97.
90. Id. at 704, 271 P.2d at 95.
91. Id. at 705, 271 P.2d at 96. The court found that the "essential deliction alleged" was
the wrongful possession of real property. Id.
92. Id. at 707, 271 P.2d at 97.
93. Id. at 709, 271 P.2d at 98.
94. Id. at 708, 271 P.2d at 98.
95. Id. at 708-09, 271 P.2d at 98. While the McNulty case illustrates judicial recognition
of separate rights to personal and real property, it contains analytical flaws. The court stated:
[There is no question that an action for the return and the value of possession of the
personal property could have been joined with the original action [involving real
property], but [the personal property action] is not so inherently connected with the
original action as to require the application of the doctrine of res judicata when it is
not so joined.
Id. at 708, 271 P.2d at 98 (emphasis added).
The court erroneously implied that the test for applying res judicata was whether the two
actions were "so inherently connected." Id. Additionally, the court may have erred in its
assertion that Eldridge could have joined her cross-complaint for quiet title and her action for
damages for withholding of personal property. Under California Code of Civil Procedure sec-
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c. other primary rights
As stated above, the right to be secure in one's person, the right to
be secure in one's property, the right to recover real property, and the
right to recover personal property are each distinct primary rights in Cal-
ifornia.96 These rights correspond to four of the separate classes of
causes of action set forth in California's former joinder statute. 97 Due to
the relationship between the joinder statute classes and recognized pri-
mary rights, the primary rights recognized most often in California have
been those expressed in the former joinder statute.
98
New primary rights have been created on occasion. For example, in
Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School District,99 a
case involving public school desegregation, the NAACP argued that the
primary right to be free from de jure segregation was separate from the
primary right to be free from de facto segregation."° The court dis-
agreed, holding that the primary right involved was the right to be free
from segregation regardless of the source. 101 In stating that children
have a primary right to equal opportunity for education, the court cre-
ated a "new" primary right by recognizing a primary right distinct from
those expressed in the former joinder statute."0 2
tion 427 (repealed 1971), the joinder statute in effect when McNulty was decided, the plaintiff
could join causes of actions in the same lawsuit only if the causes fell within certain categories.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971); see supra note 49 for the text of former Section
427. Actions to recover real property and actions to recover personal property fell into differ-
ent categories of causes of action. Id. The courts could not have applied res judicata to a claim
that the plaintiff would not have been permitted to join under former Section 427. Thus,
"inherent connection" was irrelevant both to joinder and to res judicata.
96. See supra notes 63-95 and accompanying text.
97. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971). Under former Section 427, the plaintiff
could not join a cause of action for bodily injury with a cause of action for property damage
because a cause of action for injury to person and a cause of action for injury to property
belonged to different classes of causes. Id.; see also Schermerhorn, 18 Cal. App. at 456, 123 P.
at 352. Similarly, a cause of action to recover real property and a cause of action to recover
personal property belonged to different classes of causes, and, consequently, those claims could
not be joined in the same lawsuit. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971). Other
classes of causes of action included claims based on contracts, claims based on injury to char-
acter, and claims against trustees.
98. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971). "[The] application of the primary
rights theory of causes of action in California was first reflected in the permissive joinder provi-
sions of [former Section 427 of the California Code of Civil Procedure]," Holmes, 70 Cal. 2d at
788, 452 P.2d at 649, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 433. According to one commentator, California courts
have referred to former Section 427 to determine whether causes of action for personal injury
and property damage are separate. Comment, supra note 3, at 158.
99. 750 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1984).
100. Id. at 737.
101. Id. at 738.
102. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971).
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However, courts are not always willing to recognize a new primary
right. In R & A Vending Services, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 103 a vendor
submitted a bid to operate concession stands in a Los Angeles park, but
the city chose a different vendor."° R & A sued, arguing unsuccessfully
that since R & A had promised more rent to the city than its competi-
tors, it had a "primary right to be chosen as the highest responsible bid-
der." 105 The court found that R & A did not possess a primary right to
operate its stand because provisions of the Los Angeles City Charter al-
lowed the city discretion in selecting vendors. 0 6 The R & A case illus-
trates two points: First, the primary rights concept is flexible enough to
generate arguments in favor of new primary rights;'0 7 second, even
though these arguments are quite plausible, they may not withstand at-
tack as well as more traditionally recognized rights.'08
In sum, the decisions regarding which rights are "primary" have
been guided most often by whether the right corresponded to a separate
class of cause of action under California's former joinder statute.0 9
Those rights included the right to be free from bodily injury, 1" ° the right
to be free from injury to property, I"' the right to recover real property,12l
and the right to recover personal property.' 13 However, some courts
have been willing to accord "primary" status to rights other than those
expressed in the joinder statute.
4
A plaintiff may only bring one suit to enforce a single primary
103. 172 Cal. App. 3d 1188, 218 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1985).
104. Id. at 1191, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
105. Id. at 1194, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
106. Id. at 1192-93, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
107. See infra notes 332-490 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ambiguity of the
primary rights theory.
108. The general reluctance to expand the number of recognized primary rights might be
explained by two factors. First, the courts' desire for certainty causes continued reference to
firmly established principles, and the legitimacy of most primary rights was established be-
cause they were set forth in former Section 427 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.
Holmes, 70 Cal. 2d at 788, 452 P.2d at 648, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 433; Comment, supra note 3, at
158. Second, allowing the plaintiff to bring successive suits under several causes of action
defeats one goal of res judicata-to bring an end to litigation. M. KANE, supra note 6, § 14.3,
at 615. If a plaintiff is allowed to bring multiple suits under several causes of action, this goal
is defeated.
109. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971).
110. Id., subsection 6.
111. Id., subsection 7.
112. Id., subsection 2.
113. Id., subsection 3.
114. See, eg., NAACP, 750 F.2d at 739 (applying California law) (court found primary
right to attend integrated schools); see supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of NAACP.
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right.' 15 Thus, courts must identify and legitimize particular rights as
"primary." At the same time, courts must also distinguish between a
primary right and a theory of recovery, 116 and between a primary right
and the remedy or relief sought.17
2. Primary rights distinguished from theories of recovery
Primary rights are categories of rights whose violation causes injury
to a plaintiff." 8 By contrast, theories of recovery are the legal theories
that enable a plaintiff to establish the defendant's liability. A plaintiff
may employ several theories of recovery in order to establish the defend-
ant's liability and thereby enforce the plaintiff's primary right.
For example, suppose a carpenter purchases a new power saw which
malfunctions during the warranty period and cuts off a finger. The car-
penter has suffered only one injury-injury to the person. Therefore,
only one primary right was violated in the accident-the right to per-
sonal security.1 9 Consequently, the carpenter has only one cause of ac-
tion, and he may bring only one lawsuit to recover for this injury.120
However, the carpenter has three theories of recovery that may be as-
serted against the defendant in order to enforce the single primary right:
negligence in tort, strict liability in tort, and strict liability for breach of
warranty.' 2' Which theory or combination of theories the carpenter
chooses to assert is largely a matter of strategy, depending on the particu-
lar facts of the case and what the plaintiff expects to be able to prove.'
22
However, since only one primary right is at issue, the carpenter must
115. Panos, 21 Cal. 2d at 638, 134 P.2d at 244.
116. See, e.g., Slater, 15 Cal. 3d at 795, 543 P.2d at 594-95, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27 (statu-
tory violation and negligence are separate theories of recovery through which plaintiff can
enforce -single primary right to be free from injury to person); Ford, 35 Cal. App. 3d at 679,
110 Cal. Rptr. at 61 (violation of state and federal anti-trust statutes constitutes violation of
single primary right to be free from unfair competition). See infra notes 124-35 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of Slater and notes 137-48 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Ford.
117. See, e.g., Verdier, 203 Cal. App. 2d at 737-38, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 102 (spouse who alleged
adultery and extreme cruelty as separate grounds for divorce had two causes of action even
though he sought only one divorce). See infra notes 160-70 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Verdier.
118. See 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 33, §§ 91-95.
119. See Comment, supra note 3, at 158.
120. Id.
121. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 101, at 708 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
122. The carpenter probably could not have observed either the manufacturer's or the
seller's handling of the saw because it was purchased new. Therefore, it would be difficult for
the carpenter to prove that either the manufacturer or the seller was negligent, since the car-
penter most likely has no evidence of a breach of duty. However, under either a theory of
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assert all of the theories in the same lawsuit in order to avoid a res judi-
cata bar.123
California courts distinguish primary rights and theories of recovery
in several contexts. For example, in Slater v. Blackwood,124 the plaintiff
was prohibited from bringing separate suits based on statutory violations
and common-law negligence because both suits sought recovery for the
same personal injuries. 121 In Slater, the plaintiff, Slater, was injured
while she was a passenger in a car driven by the defendant, Black-
wood. 126 Slater's complaint for damages was framed in terms of Califor-
nia's former guest statute, which precluded a non-paying passenger's
recovery unless the driver's conduct was either willful or the result of
intoxication.' 27 The judge granted Blackwood's motion for nonsuit on
the ground that the evidence did not support recovery under the guest
statute. 
128
A few years later, in a different case, the California Supreme Court
held that the guest statute was unconstitutional as applied to an "injured
nonowner guest."' 12 9 Shortly after the guest statute was held unconstitu-
tional, Slater filed a second action seeking recovery on the ground of neg-
ligence.130  She argued that her cause of action for negligence was
separate from her cause of action under the guest statute. 13 1 The court
denied recovery, stating that Slater had "misconstrue[d] the meaning of
the term " 'cause of action.' ,132 The court acknowledged that the two
suits sought relief under two different legal theories-the first was statu-
strict liability in tort or a theory of strict liability for breach of warranty, the carpenter will not
be required to prove negligence. Id. § 103, at 713.
123. 4 B. WrrKIN, supra note 1, § 25.
124. 15 Cal. 3d 791, 543 P.2d 593, 26 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1975).
125. Id. at 795, 543 P.2d at 594-95, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27.
126. Id. at 794, 543 P.2d at 593, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
127. Id., 543 P.2d at 594, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 226. Automobile guest statutes generally pro-
vide that the driver of an automobile is not liable to a non-paying passenger for damages
resulting from the driver's simple negligence; rather, the passenger can only recover if he can
show "gross negligence or some other form of aggravated misconduct" on the part of the
driver. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 121, § 34, at 215. The proclaimed purposes behind
guest statutes are: (1) to encourage driver "hospitality" by protecting drivers from suits by
"ungrateful non-paying guest[s];" and (2) to prevent collusion between driver and "guest" to
defraud the driver's insurer. Id.
128. Slater, 15 Cal. 3d at 794, 543 P.2d at 594, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 226. On appeal, Slater
argued that the guest statutd was unconstitutional and that she should be allowed to recover
upon a showing of simple negligence. Id. The court of appeal rejected this argument and
affirmed the judgment. Id. The California Supreme Court denied a hearing in June, 1972. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 795, 543 P.2d at 594, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
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tory, and the second was common-law negligence.1 33 However, the court
emphasized that a plaintiff's cause of action "is based upon the harm
suffered, as opposed to the particular theory asserted by the litigant."'
' 34
Thus, the first judgment in the driver's favor was a bar to the second suit,
since both suits were based on a violation of the same primary right.
3 5
Similarly, separate state and federal statutes do not create separate
primary rights if both statutes seek to protect the plaintiff from the same
kind of harm.' 36 In Ford Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 37 plaintiff Car-
trade, Inc. (Cartrade) brought its first suit in federal court against Ford
Motor Company (Ford) and a dealers' advertising association. 38 Car-
trade alleged that the two defendants had conspired to put Cartrade out
of business in violation of the Sherman Act. 3 9 Both defendants obtained
a directed verdict.'
40
Cartrade filed its second suit in state court.14 ' The complaint al-
133. Id. at 794-95, 543 P.2d at 594-95, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27.
134. Id. at 795, 543 P.2d at 594, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
135. Id., 543 P.2d at 594-95, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 227. A few other aspects of the Slater case
are worthy of note. One is that its result is quite harsh, considering that while the guest statute
was in effect, the statute prohibited Slater's negligence action. She argued that for this reason,
her second suit should not be barred by res judicata. Id. at 796, 543 P.2d at 595, 126 Cal.
Rptr. at 227. The court rejected this argument, stating: "'Our Courts have repeatedly refused
to treat the self-evident hardship occasioned by a change in the law as a reason to revive dead
actions.'" Id. at 797, 543 P.2d at 595-96, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 227-28 (emphasis omitted) (quot-
ing Zeppi v. State of California, 203 Cal. App. 2d 386, 388-89, 21 Cal. Rptr. 534, 536 (1962)).
Second, the Slater court noted the confusion between the terms "cause of action" and
"count": "[Tihe phrase 'cause of action' is 'often used indiscriminately to mean what it says
and to mean counts which state differently the same cause of action.'" Id. at 796, 543 P.2d at
595, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 227 (quoting Eichler Homes of San Mateo, Inc. v. Superior Court, 55
Cal. 2d 845, 847, 361 P.2d 914, 916, 13 Cal. Rptr. 194, 196 (1961)).
Third, the Slater court used some confusing language despite its avowed adherence to the
primary rights theory. The court stated that California follows the primary rights theory and
emphasized that Slater suffered violation of only one primary right. Id. at 795, 543 P.2d at
594, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 226. However, in the same paragraph, the court stated: "It is clearly
established that '.. . there is but one cause of action for one personal injury [which is incurred]
by reason of one wrongful act.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Busick v. Workmen's Com-
pensation Appeals Bd., 7 Cal. 3d 967, 975, 500 P.2d 1386, 1392, 104 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48 (1972)).
"One wrongful act" is much closer to the same transaction definition of a cause of action than
it is to the primary rights definition. Clearly, a single "wrongful act" can give rise to violation
of more than one primary right, and these violations give the plaintiff more than one cause of
action. 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 43; see also supra notes 64-95 and accompanying text.
The Slater court's use of "one wrongful act" criteria may indicate the tendency of the courts to
employ the same transaction definition despite primary rights constraints.
136. Ford, 35 Cal. App. 3d at 679, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
137. 35 Cal. App. 3d 676, 110 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1973).
138. Id. at 678, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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leged the same acts that were alleged in the first suit, but this time Car-
trade charged that these acts constituted violations of state unfair
competition statutes.142 The court held that Cartrade had split its cause
of action and, consequently, the second suit was barred by res judicata.1
43
The court explained that although separate state and federal remedies
were available for illegal interference with business, Cartrade's two suits
were based on the violation of a single primary right.1" Thus, Cartrade
had only one cause of action.
1 45
While several courts have distinguished between primary rights and
theories of recovery, other courts have faced the related problem of de-
termining whether separate acts rendering a defendant liable under a sin-
gle theory of recovery constitute violations of separate primary rights. 146
The key to this determination is the number of plaintiff's interests in-
jured by the defendant's conduct. 4 7 If the plaintiff suffers only one in-
jury to one interest, then only one primary right is violated, regardless of
how many acts the defendant committed in the course of causing the
injury.
148
The California Supreme Court limited the plaintiff to a single cause
of action in Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., 149 where different occur-
rences were actionable under a single negligence theory of recovery. Pa-
nos, the plaintiff, went to the Great Western Packing Company (Great
Western) to purchase meat.1 50 While there, he was struck and injured by
a large piece of meat conveyed on an overhead trolley.151 Panos initially
sued Great Western and Wilson Lee, another customer, alleging that Lee
had negligently pushed the meat, thereby causing it to strike Panos. 152
Panos further alleged that Great Western was negligent in allowing Wil-
son to enter its premises, take possession of the meat, and use the trolley
so as to injure Panos. 153 Judgment was rendered in favor of Lee and
Great Western. 1
54
142. Id.
143. Id. at 680, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
144. Id. at 679, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
145. Id. The court noted that both the state and federal claims could have been asserted in
the federal action pursuant to the federal court's exercise of pendent subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 679-80, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
146. See, e.g., Panos v. Great W. Packing Co., 21 Cal. 2d 636, 134 P.2d 242 (1943).
147. Id. at 638, 124 P.2d at 244.
148. Id.
149. 21 Cal. 2d 636, 134 P.2d 242 (1943).
150. Id. at 636-37, 134 P.2d at 243.
151. Id. at 637, 134 P.2d at 243.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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Four months later, Panos brought a second suit against Great West-
ern, alleging that Great Western itself had negligently operated the trol-
ley.155 Panos argued that the first and second suits were based on
separate causes of action "because the negligence charged to [Great
Western] in [the second] action differ[ed] from the negligence charged
against it in the prior action."' 56 The court disagreed, finding that Panos
had only one cause of action because he had suffered only one injury, and
consequently only one of his primary rights had been violated. 7
In sum, a primary right is distinct from a theory of recovery. If only
one of the plaintiff's primary rights is violated, the plaintiff must assert
all of the possible legal theories to enforce that right in the same lawsuit
or risk a res judicata bar. Similarly, the plaintiff must allege all manifes-
tations of a single theory in the same lawsuit because, in California, a
cause of action for purposes of res judicata is defined in terms of the
number of primary rights violated.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 638, 134 P.2d at 244.
157. Id. As in Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 543 P.2d 593, 126 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1975), the Panos court's language is confusing, even contradictory, when the court explained
why only one of Panos' primary rights was violated. The court stated:
The negligence of defendant alleged in the prior action and that alleged against it in
this action represent but different invasions of plaintiff's primary right and different
breaches of the same duty that it owed to him. There was one injury and one cause of
action. A single tort can be the foundation for but one claim for damages.
Panos, 21 Cal. 3d at 638, 134 P.2d at 244 (emphasis added). The Panos court erroneously
implied that the "one injury" test and the "single tort" test are equivalent. Under the primary
rights theory, one injury gives rise to only one cause of action. Slater, 15 Cal. 3d at 795, 543
P.2d at 594, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 226. However, a "single tort" can cause multiple injuries. Thus,
under the primary rights theory, a "single tort" can provide the basis for more than one cause
of action if the injuries constitute violation of more than one primary right. Lamb v. Har-
baugh, 105 Cal. 681, 689, 39 P. 56, 57 (1895); 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 43.
In Panos, both suits alleged personal injury. 21 Cal. 2d at 637, 134 P.2d at 243. If the
second suit had alleged property damage instead, the second suit would have been allowed if
the court were to use the "one injury" test. However, if the "single tort" standard were ap-
plied, it would not matter that the second suit alleged a different kind of injury or that it
alleged a violation of a different primary right; a second suit for property damage would be
disallowed if the damages resulted from a "single tort." Thus, by indicating that a "single
tort" gives rise to only one cause of action, the court appears to be endorsing the same transac-
tion definition of a cause of action.
Today, the California courts may reach the same result that would be obtained under the
same transaction definition despite purported adherence to the primary rights theory. This can
happen because the concept of a primary right is ambiguous; thus, the right at issue can be
defined so broadly that the right encompasses the entire issue that gives rise to the claim. See,
e.g., Takahashi v. Board of Trustees, 783 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182
(1986) (applying California law) (plaintiff alleged violations of contract and personal injury
rights in separate suits, but court found violation of only one contractual right while personal
injury, in form of emotional distress, was merely element of consequential damages). See infra
notes 468-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of Takahashi.
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3. Primary right distinguished from remedy or relief sought
A plaintiff may seek several remedies for injuries sustained in a sin-
gle event, or may seek a single remedy for several wrongs. 158 However,
the number of remedies a plaintiff seeks has no effect on the number of
primary rights violated;"5 9 therefore, the number of remedies sought does
not determine the number of causes of action. This distinction was illus-
trated in Verdier v. Verdier,"6° where a husband brought two separate
suits for divorce. Verdier's first suit, filed in France, was grounded in
adultery.'6 After four years, the French action had not been resolved,
so Verdier filed a second divorce action in California grounded in ex-
treme cruelty.1 62 Approximately two and one-half years after filing the
California suit, Verdier dismissed it with prejudice,1 63 but he expressly
reserved the right to prosecute the French suit."6
Verdier's wife sought to enjoin her husband's prosecution of the
French action on the ground that her husband could obtain only one
divorce.1 65  The court disagreed, stating that she had confused "the
sought relief with the primary right which constitutes the cause of ac-
tion." 166 Violation of a single primary right may entitle the plaintiff to a
variety of remedies, including divorce, separation, and support.1 67 How-
ever, the primary right violated, rather than the remedy sought, deter-
mines whether one or more causes of action have been asserted. 168 Thus,
although the husband had sought the same remedy in both actions, he
had alleged violations of separate primary rights: "the right not to be
subjected to extreme cruelty... [and the right] not to have one's spouse
engage in adulterous conduct .... ,169 Therefore, Verdier had two
causes of action.1
70
158. 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 29.
159. Verdier, 203 Cal. App. 2d at 740, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
160. 203 Cal. App. 2d 724, 22 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1962).
161. Id. at 727, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
162. Id., 22 Cal. Rptr. at 95-96.
163. Id. at 729, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 737-38, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
166. Id. at 738, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 737-38, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
170. Id. The Verdier suit would proceed very differently today. In 1962, when Verdier was
decided, California courts granted divorces on a "fault" basis. CAL. CIV. CODE § 92 (repealed
1969). Thus, to show "fault," a spouse seeking a divorce had to base the divorce action on one
of the following causes: (1) adultery; (2) extreme cruelty; (3) willful desertion; (4) willful ne-
glect; (5) habitual intemperance; (6) conviction of a felony; or (7) incurable insanity. Id. In
1969, the California Legislature passed the Family Law Act, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3314, ch. 1608,
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In sum, the plaintiff's primary right is distinct from the relief sought
by the plaintiff. In a second suit, the defendant cannot plead res judicata
on the grounds that plaintiff is seeking the same relief as he sought in the
first suit if the two suits allege violations of different primary rights.
C. Summary
The identification of specific primary rights, along with the distinc-
tions between primary rights and theories of recovery, and between pri-
mary rights and remedies, are the cornerstones of the operation of the
primary rights theory. The operation of the primary rights theory has, in
turn, determined how and when res judicata is applied in California.
At one time, the primary rights theory was consistent with the con-
cepts governing the related procedures of pleading, amendment, and
joinder. However, these procedures have changed substantially, 171 and
the changes have made the primary rights theory functionally obsolete.
III. DISHARMONY BETWEEN RES JUDICATA AND THE RELATED
PROCEDURES OF PLEADING, AMENDMENT, AND JOINDER
A. Historical Development of Pleading, Amendment, and Joinder
1. The forms of action at common law
Until the mid-i 850s, a plaintiff brought an action at law by securing
a writ that most closely fit the wrong he had suffered. 172 The writ was
similar in function to the modern summons, I7 3 but separate writs, or
"forms of action" evolved to cover different wrongs.' 74 Thus, for exam-
ple, if the plaintiff. wanted to sue the defendant for trespass, debt, and
nuisance, the plaintiff had to obtain three separate writs and bring three
§ 8 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5317 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989)) which
eliminated the "fault" element in divorce. Today, a court may "decree a dissolution of the
marriage or legal separation" on grounds of: (1) "[i]rreconcilable differences, which have
caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage"; or (2) "[i]ncurable insanity." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4506 (West 1983).
171. See infra notes 172-318 and accompanying text.
172. M. KANE, supra note 6, § 5.4 at 243. The 1848 Field Code of Civil Procedure,
adopted first in New York and shortly thereafter in California, heralded a significant departure
from common-law procedure. J. COUND, supra note 14, ch. 4, § D, at 426.
173. J. COUND, supra note 14, ch. 4, § A, at 388; see also J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, supra
note 32, § 8, which discusses the development of the writ system.
174. Comment, Civil Procedure-What Identifies a "Cause of Action" Joinders, 50 MARQ.
L. REV. 101, 102 (1966). According to one authority, "The writs were like doors to the king's
courts; there was one for big dogs and a smaller one for little dogs; there were doors for yellow
dogs and black dogs, and the door of case for mongrel curs of no particular breed, but just
plain dogs." B. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING § 30, at 60 n. 11 (3d ed.
1923).
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separate suits.175 Furthermore, each form of action was a package con-
taining its own substantive law and procedure.
176
The common-law, or "writ" system began to evolve in England at
the time of the Norman conquest. 177 Initially, the plaintiff would apply
to the Chancellor for an Original Writ, which authorized one of the
king's courts to try a specific action.178 Several kinds of injuries occurred
frequently, and writs for these injuries were issued repeatedly. 179 If a
writ was issued often enough, it was placed on the Register of Writs and
became a Writ of Course. 180 A Writ of Course could be issued to anyone
who applied for it and paid the proper fee.' 8 ' The writ served three func-
tions: (1) It gave the court jurisdiction over the parties; (2) it gave the
court jurisdiction over the subject matter; and (3) it limited the scope of
the action to trespass, debt, nuisance, or whatever form of action that the
plaintiff had selected.' 82
After securing the desired writ, the plaintiff had to file a Declara-
tion, the equivalent of the modem complaint, 8 3 stating the facts consti-
tuting the claim.18 4 The facts had to be set forth in the context of a
right/duty relationship between the litigants; the Declaration had to
state the plaintiff's right, the defendant's violation of that right by a
wrongful act, and the resulting damages.'8 5 If the facts set forth in the
Declaration showed that the plaintiff selected the wrong writ, the com-
plaint was dismissed and the plaintiff had to begin again.'86 A plaintiff
could only join claims if they were both covered by the same writ or form
of action; separate suits on each writ were required.'8 7 An underlying
premise of the common-law trial was that only one simple issue could be
tried at one time.'
88
175. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 9.2, at 463.
176. J. COUND, supra note 14, ch. 4, § A, at 388.
177. J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, supra note 32, § 5, at 33-34.
178. Id. at 32.
179. Id. § 13, at 59.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. § 8, at 38.
183. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 1.3, at 10.
184. J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, supra note 32, § 21, at 86.
185. Id. at 86-89.
186. Id. § 8, at 39.
187. Toelle, Joinder of Actions-With Special Reference to the Montana and California
Practice, 18 CALIF. L. REv. 459, 460-61 (1930). There were limited exceptions to this rule:
debt could be joined with detinue, and case could be joined with trover. Id. at 461.
188. Comment, supra note 174, at 102. The desire for simplicity can be traced to the modes
of proof that were used before the jury became the trier of fact. Blume, A Rational Theory for
Joinder of Causes of Action and Defenses, and for the Use of Counterclaims, 26 MICH. L. REV.
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Thus, under the writ system, form often prevailed over substance." 9
If the plaintiff made the technical error of choosing the improper writ,
the suit was dismissed, despite the merits of the claim. 190 Additionally,
the common-law courts required the plaintiff to prosecute a separate law-
suit for each issue, even though the evidence to prove all of the conten-
tions might be identical. 91 The result was that the common-law system
was often unfair to the litigants' 92 and burdensome to the courts.
193
Therefore, the courts of equity became a desirable alternative.' 94
2. Equity
The separate system of equity courts evolved as a result of the law
courts' inadequacies.' 95 The forms of action in the law courts did not
cover every legally cognizable injury, and, therefore, plaintiffs were
sometimes left with no remedy at law.' 96 At times, the law courts' proce-
dures were inadequate to secure necessary evidence. 197 Additionally,
some local law courts were plagued by inefficiency and corruption. 198
For these reasons, a plaintiff was often allowed to circumvent the law
courts by petitioning directly to the king and his council, who referred
1, 2-3 (1927). Under these modes of proof, the defendant was tried by oath, battle, or ordeal.
Id. at 2. If he was tried by ordeal, he could not "sink and float at the same time"; if he was
tried by battle, he could not be "both the victor and the vanquished," Id. Thus, if the defend-
ant was tried under one of these modes, he had to be completely innocent or completely guilty.
Id. Accordingly, only one controversy could be settled at one time. If the defendant were to
be tried on two issues, it was possible that he might win on one and lose on the other, and this
outcome could not have been accommodated. Id. Nevertheless, when trial by jury replaced
the older modes, the single-issue tradition persisted, and later jurists rationalized its perpetua-
tion with the notion that" 'the twelve men (the jury) are commonly rude and ignorant, and so,
consequently, not proper to be troubled with too many things at one time.' "Id. at 2-3 (quot-
ing H. STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 55 n,57
(S. Tyler ed. 1871)).
189. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 1.6, at 17 ("Too often mistakes of form led to
loss of a suit by the party entitled to win on the merits.").
190. M. KANE, supra note 6, § 5.4, at 246.
191. C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 67, at 436.
192. F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 1.6, at 17.
193. Since a plaintiff was usually not allowed to join two forms of action in the same suit,
the plaintiff had to bring separate lawsuits on injuries arising from the same occurrence.
Toelle, supra note 187, at 460-61. In this situation, the courts spent twice the judicial re-
sources that would have been required if the plaintiff could have joined the claims. The equity
courts recognized the improvidence of this system. Blume, supra note 188, at 10 ("While
courts of law were condemning a multiplicity of issues, courts of equity were condemning a
multiplicity of suits.").
194. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 1.4, at 11.
195. Id. at 11-12.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 12.
198. Id.
November 1989] RES JUDICATA AND PRIMAR Y RIGHTS
the matter to a chancellor.1 9 9 Thus, the jurisdiction of the equity courts
was completely separate from that of the law courts.2°"
The equity court system had its own body of substantive and proce-
dural law.2"' The procedures were quite different from those in the law
courts.2 02 The "forms of action" that separated the issues in the courts
of law did not exist in equity, and the absence of rigid categories affected
both pleading and joinder of causes.2"3 With respect to pleading, the for-
mation of a legal issue was not emphasized;2" instead, equity pleadings
were sworn statements containing facts set forth in considerable detail.20 5
With respect to joinder of causes, the equity courts were much more
flexible than the law courts, because joinder in equity was based on differ-
ent principles.20 6 Equity procedure was based on trial convenience, and
the Chancellor (the judge in the equity courts) had discretion to permit
joinder in each case.207 Equity courts would try multiple issues that
arose "out of the same transaction or out of transactions connected with
199. Id.
200. Id. at 13 ("[E]quity jurisdiction remained extraordinary and in some sense extra-
legal.").
201. Id.
202. Blume, supra note 188, at 16.
203. C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 5, at 16.
204. Id.
205. Id. These statements served a dual function: they set forth the parties' contentions,
and they also constituted the evidence upon which the case was decided. M. KANE, supra note
6, § 5.1, at 237.
Although the equity pleading system had definite advantages, it was not without its
drawbacks.
A bill in [equity] was a marvellous [sic] document, which stated the plaintiff's
case at full length and three times over. There was first the part in which the story
was circumstantially set forth. Then came the part which "charged" its truth against
the defendant--or, in other words, which set it forth all over again in an aggrieved
tone. Lastly came the interrogating part, which converted the original allegations
into a chain of subtly framed inquiries addressed to the defendant, minutely dove-
tailed and circuitously arranged so as to surround a slippery conscience and to stop
up every earth. No layman, however intelligent, could compose the "answer" with-
out professional aid. It was inevitably so elaborate and so long, that the responsibil-
ity for the accuracy of the story shifted, during its telling, from the conscience of the
defendant to that of his ... counsel, and truth found no difficulty in disappearing
during the operation.
J. COUND, supra note 14, ch. 4, § C, at 420-22 (quoting BOWEN, Progress in the Administra-
tion of Justice During the Victorian Period, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 516, 524-27 (1907)).
Modem code pleading does not require the same factual detail that was required in eq-
uity. C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 5, at 16-17. One possible explanation for this difference is
that under the codes, the facts alleged in the pleadings do not constitute evidence. F. JAMES &
G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 3.5.
206. Blume, supra note 188, at 10.
207. Toelle, supra note 187, at 465.
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the subject of the action, ' 2°s or if the issues presented "common ques-
tions of law or fact."' 20 9 While the law courts presumed that their juries
were incapable of handling complex issues,210 this concern was inapplica-
ble in equity because the equity courts had no jury.21 A defendant who
objected to joinder in equity had to show that he would be clearly
prejudiced if joinder were allowed.212
Thus, joinder was significantly different in the equity courts and the
law courts. While joinder of causes at law was generally allowed only if
the causes fell within the same form of action,213 equity courts aimed to
resolve as much as possible in a single lawsuit. 214 The equity courts'
flexibility was attractive in comparison to the rigidity of the common-law
courts. 21 5 Reform came to the law courts through the Field Codes,
which borrowed several practices from the equity courts.
21 6
3. The codes
The development of the Codes of Civil Procedure began in New
York.2 17 In 1846, New York adopted a new constitution which made
two significant changes in common-law procedure.2 8 First, the equity
court was abolished. 219 Second, commissioners were appointed to revise
208. Id.
209. Id. at 464.
210. Id. at 463.
211. C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 5, at 16.
212. Toelle, supra note 187, at 464.
213. Id. at 460-61.
214. Id. at 464-65.
215. C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 5.
By contrast, some scholars think that the flaws of common-law pleading have been un-
duly emphasized, and that the contributions made by common-law pleading to modem juris-
prudence have not received sufficient credit:
Infinite damage has been done to the cause of legitimate Legal Reform ... by
proclaiming the concept that all that has gone before in our procedural ancestry
should be regarded as obsolete and worthless, and is not to be considered in terms of
Modem Pleading and Practice ... and Modem Legal Education. Those who take
this limited view have clearly confused the real merits of the Common-Law System
with those portions of the System which were needlessly technical, thus overlooking
the salient fact that it had developed many sound and enduring principles of legal
procedure. They have also overlooked the fact that there is great similarity in the
essential principles underlying Pleading at Common Law, in Equity, under Modern
Codes and Practice Acts, and even under the ... Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
... than is generally realized.
J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, supra note 32, at 5.
216. Id. § 5, at 16-17.
217. J. COUND, supra note 14, ch. 4, § D, at 426.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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and simplify civil procedure in New York's law courts.220 The commis-
sioners were directed to create a system that would: (1) eliminate the
forms of action in the courts of law, (2) establish uniform procedures that
would be applicable to both legal and equitable actions, and (3) eliminate
"any form and proceeding not necessary to preserve the rights of the
parties. 2 21
The First Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings
was issued in 1848.222 Later that year, the New York Legislature en-
acted its Code of Civil Procedure.223 The New York Code became the
prototype for similar codes in other states, 224 and influenced the develop-
ment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.22 5 The codes were often
called "Field Codes," named after the influential commissioner David
Dudley Field.226 California adopted the Code in 185 1.227
The Code produced three major departures from common-law pro-
cedure. First, procedural differences between actions at law and actions
in equity were abolished.2 28 Second, the forms of action were abol-
ished,22 9 and only one form of action, the "civil action," remained.230
Third, the emphasis in pleading shifted from issues to facts.231 Due to
these changes, the procedures of pleading, joinder, and amendment
under the Code came to be limited by facts instead of by legal categories.
a. pleading
The Code's creators intended to eliminate "issue pleading" en-
220. Id.
221. Id. (quoting 1847 N.Y. Laws 66, 67-68, ch. 59, § 8).
222. Id.
223. 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, ch. 379, §§ 1-391; J. COUND, supra note 14, ch. 4, § D, at 428.
224. J. COUND, supra note 14, ch. 4, § D, at 428.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Practice Act of 1851, 1851 Cal. Stat. 51, ch. 5, §§ 1-649 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 307-1058 (1872); Recommendation of the Califor-
nia Law Revision Commission Relating to Counterclaims and Cross-Complaints, Joinder of
Causes of Action, and Related Provisions, 10 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 501, 507 n.2
(1970) [hereinafter Recommendation]. The Practice Act of 1851, which was based on the
original New York Code, introduced the Code into California. Id.
228. C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 8, at 23.
229. Id. at 22-23.
230. Id. at 23. In California, "[t]here is... but one form of civil actions for the enforce-
ment or protection of private rights and the redress or prevention of private wrongs." CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 307 (West 1982). In federal courts, "[there shall be one form of action to
be known as 'civil action."' FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
231. C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 7, at 22-23. "Issue pleading" had been required at com-
mon law. Id. § 5, at 16. By contrast, in the equity courts, the plaintiff was required to plead
facts in considerable detail. Id. See infra notes 232-43 for a discussion of code pleading.
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tirely.232 Instead, the plaintiff was supposed to allege only the "dry, na-
ked, actual facts" that constituted the grievance against the defendant.
233
Conclusions of law and evidentiary matters were supposed to be ex-
cluded from the pleadings.234 While the plaintiff's complaint would have
been dismissed at common law if the facts stated did not fit the form of
action selected,235 under the Code, the court could consider "the whole
substantive law" in deciding whether the plaintiff had alleged sufficient
facts to state a cause of action.236 It was the province of the court, not
the plaintiff, to identify and apply law to facts, and thus establish a legal
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.237
The segregation of factual allegations from conclusions of law has
not continued in modem California code pleading. 238 Rather, the cur-
rent test in California is "whether the pleading as a whole apprises the
adversary of the factual basis of the claim."'239 The difficulty in practice
of distinguishing among facts, conclusions of law, and evidence2 40 led to
the rule that the presence of conclusions of law in a complaint does not
constitute grounds for dismissal.24 1 However, the plaintiff must still al-
lege sufficient facts in his complaint to state a cause of action, or his
complaint can be dismissed on grounds of insufficiency.242 Thus, in Cali-
fornia, category-based criteria for determining the sufficiency of a plead-
232. D. FIELD, PLEADING MANUAL, Second Rule, reprinted in CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 425.10, Code Commissioners' Note (Deering 1972); see also 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1,
§ 332, at 382. "Under the common-law system the pleadings were expected to formulate the
issue to be tried. The original code ideal was that the pleadings should disclose the material
facts of the case." C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 11, at 54.
233. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 3.6, at 138 (quoting J. POMEROY, REMEDIES
AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS § 529, at 566 (1876)).
234. D. FIELD, supra note 232; see also 4 B. WITKIN, Supra note 1, § 332, at 382.
235. J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, supra note 32, § 8, at 39. See supra notes 172-93 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the forms of action.
236. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 3.5, at 136.
237. D. FIELD, supra note 232; see also 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 332, at 382.
238. 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 332, at 382-83.
239. Id. at 383 (citing Semole v. Sansoucie, 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721, 104 Cal. Rptr. 897,
901 (1972)) (emphasis added).
Code pleading differs from "notice pleading" in that notice pleading requires the plaintiff
to provide only "a brief general statement of the matter involved, sufficient merely to give the
opposing party reasonable notice of the claim .... "Id. § 333, at 383-84. The notice pleading
approach thus omits detailed factual statements. Id.
A variation of notice pleading is used in federal courts. "A pleading which sets forth a
claim for relief... shall contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
240. 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 332, at 382-83.
241. Id. at 383 (citing Krug v. Meeham, 109 Cal. App. 2d 274, 277, 240 P.2d 732, 733-34
(1952)).
242. Id.
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ing have been supplanted by criteria based on facts.2 4 3
b. amendment
At common law, a plaintiff was allowed to correct errors and omis-
sions in his pleadings if the corrections did not change the form of action
selected. 2' After the forms of action were abolished,2 45 this rule had no
purpose.246 Still, under the California Code, the plaintiff was not allowed
to amend a complaint if the amendment alleged violation of a different
primary right, thereby changing the cause of action alleged in the origi-
nal complaint. 247 However, the amendment was allowed to change the
legal theory248 or the relief sought.249 The prohibition against amend-
ments which involved a new cause of action was justified by two reasons:
(1) the defendant should not be expected to prepare for an entirely new
case within the time originally allotted; and (2) the plaintiff should not be
allowed to circumvent the statute of limitations by bringing a new cause
of action as an amendment to the original cause of action. 5 0 For these
purposes, the scope of the cause of action was determined according to
the primary rights theory.25'
Critics of this rule pointed out that it was often more -difficult for the
defendant to respond to a new legal theory than to a technical change in
the cause of action . 2  Eventually, the "same cause of action" rule was
abandoned,253 and the plaintiff is now permitted to amend a complaint
provided that he seeks recovery "on the same general set of facts.
'25 4
Thus, limitations on amendment became divorced from forms of action,
causes of action, primary rights, or any other legal category.
c. joinder
Vestiges of the common-law forms of action survived under the
243. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.10(a) (West Supp. 1989).
244. B. SHIPMAN, supra note 174, § 163, at 296.
245. See supra notes 172-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the forms of action
at common law.
246. J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, supra note 32, § 302, at 562.
247. 5 B. WrrKIN, supra note 1, § 1145, at 562.
248. Id. § 1157, at 574.
249. Id. § 1156, at 573.
250. Id. § 1145, at 562.
251. Id. § 1161, at 579. See supra notes 21-170 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the development and application of the primary rights theory in California.
252. 5 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 1161, at 579.
253. Id. § 1162, at 579.
254. Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 56 Cal. 2d 596, 600, 364 P.2d 681, 683,
15 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819 (1961); 5 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 1162, at 579.
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Code, particularly with respect to joinder.15 5 The Code joinder stat-
utes-like the common law-divided actions at law into specific catego-
ries, and initially, actions falling within separate categories could not be
joined in the same lawsuit.256 The permissive joinder provision of the
California Practice Act of 1851,257 which was based on the original New
York Code provision,25 8 identified the categories of claims which could
be joined." 9
The joinder statute categories demonstrated California's commit-
ment to the primary rights theory. 260 The statute clearly prohibited join-
der of causes which were based on violations of separate primary
rights,261 but the statute also implied that separate primary rights gave
rise to separate causes of action.262 The statute was described as "arbi-
trary and not based on reasons of fairness and convenience. 2 63 Thus,
the statute set the stage for illogical and inefficient results.2 4
Any of the statute's specific actions at law could be joined with an
equitable action,265 but this leeway did not always allow the plaintiff to
join all of the claims he might have arising from the same occurrence.266
For example, if the defendant simultaneously beat the plaintiff, ripped his
clothes, and slandered him in front of his peers, the plaintiff had to bring
separate suits for battery, injury to property, and defamation, because
these injuries fell into three different classes.267
255. See Blume, supra note 188, at 17-18; Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 3; Toelle, supra
note 187, at 466-67.
256. 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 525, ch. 379, § 143; 1851 Cal. Stat. 51, 59-60, ch. 5, § 64 (codi-
fied as amended at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971)).
257. 1851 Cal. Stat. 51, 59-60, ch. 5, § 64 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 427 (repealed 1971)).
258. 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 525, ch. 379, § 143.
259. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971).
260. Holmes v. David Bricker, Inc., 70 Cal. 2d 786, 788, 452 P.2d 647, 649, 76 Cal. Rptr.
431, 433 (1969).
261. Id.
262. The link between the separate classes of causes of action for purposes of joinder and
separate causes of action based on primary rights for purposes of resjudicata has been assumed
rather than explained. See 4 B. WiTKIN, supra note 1, § 43; Comment, supra note 3, at 158 &
n.7.
263. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 4.
264. Id. at 2-3.
265. Toelle, supra note 187, at 467.
266. See, e.g., Schermerhorn v. Los Angeles Pac. R.R. Co., 18 Cal. App. 454, 123 P. 351
(1912). The appellate court in Schermerhorn confirmed that the plaintiff would have been
unable to join claims for bodily injury and property damage in the same lawsuit even though
the plaintiff sustained both injuries as the result of the defendant's single act. Id. at 456, 123 P.
at 352. See supra notes 71-76 for a discussion of Schermerhorn.
267. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971); Toelle, supra note 187, at 467. Under
former Section 427, battery constituted injury to person (class no. 6), destruction of clothes
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Yet, the plaintiff could join two unrelated actions for breach of con-
tract. 268 For example, one California plaintiff was allowed to join claims
on an implied contract and on a wholly separate written contract to
which he was not a party but upon which he had been assigned the right
to sue.269 The contract class was so broad that it allowed joinder of to-
tally unrelated claims, 27 ° while the tort classes were so narrow that inju-
ries suffered during the same occurrence often could not be joined.271
In 1907, Section 427 was amended to add another joinder class.2 72
This eighth class allowed the plaintiff to:
unite several actions in the same complaint, where they all arise
out of... the same transaction, or transactions connected with
the same subject of action, and not included within one of the
foregoing subdivisions of this section.
The causes of action so united must all belong to only one of
these classes.., but an action for malicious arrest and prosecu-
tion, or either of them, may be united with an action for either
injury to character or to the person.273
The wording of the eighth class produced confusion.274 If the
amendment were read literally, a plaintiff could not join causes of action
arising out of the same transaction if those actions fell into one of the first
seven categories. Since the first seven classes encompassed almost all
conceivable causes, the amendment would not have had an expansive ef-
fect had it been narrowly construed.275 However, many courts believed
that the legislature intended to liberalize joinder, and they carried out
this intent by "simply ignor[ing] the wording of the section. '276 Indeed,
a literal reading of the "same transaction" portion of the amendment
appeared to be at odds with the other part of the amendment which al-
lowed actions for malicious prosecution to be tried with actions for inju-
constituted injury to property (class no. 7), and defamation constituted injury to character
(class no. 5). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971).
268. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 4.
269. Id. (citing Frazer v. Oakdale Lumber & Water Co., 73 Cal. 187, 14 P. 829 (1887)).
270. Toelle, supra note 187, at 467.
271. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 4.
272. 1907 Cal. Stat. 705, 705-06, ch. 372, § 2 (codified at CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 427
(repealed 1971)).
273. Id. (emphasis added).
274. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 2.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 3. See Boulden v. Thompson, 21 Cal. App. 279, 281, 161 P. 765, 765-66 (1913);
1 J. CHADBOURN, H. GROSSMAN & A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA PLEADING § 815, at 739-
42 (1961).
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ries to property or to character.277
Subsequent amendments to Section 427 bolstered the notion that the
legislature wanted to expand joinder. In 1915, Section 427 was amended
to allow claims for injuries to property and injuries to person "growing
out of the same tort" to be joined in the same complaint.2 71 In 1931, a
ninth category was added, so that a plaintiff could join "[a]ny and all
claims for injuries arising out of a conspiracy, whether of the same or of
different character, or done at the same or different times. '2 79 However,
despite these changes, the restrictive language of the eighth category was
never deleted.280
In 1970, Professor Jack H. Friedenthal published a study28' which
criticized the wording of Section 427 and its amendments.28 2 However,
Friedenthal did not believe that the confusing language was Section 427's
most serious flaw.283 He stated that "the entire concept behind [Section
427 made] little sense,""" and he saw no need to restrict joinder of
causes at all.285 He pointed out that to the extent that courts read the
"same transaction" category narrowly, a plaintiff was forced to bring
separate tort actions for separate injuries resulting from the same event;
thus, the same evidence would have to be presented twice.2 6 By con-
trast, completely unrelated claims could be joined under the contract cat-
egory.287 However, this situation had "not produced any suggestion that
such joinder should be curtailed. ' 288 He noted that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 18(a) allowed unlimited joinder of claims, 2 9 and that Rule
18(a) had become a model joinder provision for several states.290
277. See supra text accompanying note 273.
278. 1915 Cal. Stat. 30, ch. 28, § 1.
279. 1931 Cal. Stat. 396, ch. 224, § 1.
280. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 2.
281. Friedenthal, supra note 15.
282. Id. at 1-4.
283. Id. at 4.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 5.
286. Id. at 4.
287. See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
288. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 5.
289. Id. Rule 18(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that any "party asserting
a claim for relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may
join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime,
as the party has against the opposing party." FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
290. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 5. Professor Friedenthal believed "'Of all the provisions
of the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] and their state counterparts dealing with joinder,
[Rule 18(a) governing] joinder of claims has operated most smoothly and satisfactorily.'" Id.
(quoting Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading Rules, 36 MINN. L.
REV. 580, 582 (1952)).
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Friedenthal also examined California's own rules regarding joinder
of defendant's counterclaims and cross-complaints.291 These rules al-
lowed the defendant to bring a cross-complaint against a co-defendant if
it arose out of the "same transaction" as the plaintiff's claim, and al-
lowed the defendant to counterclaim against the plaintiff regardless of
whether the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction.
292
Friedenthal found it anomalous that the defendant was permitted broad
joinder of counterclaims and cross-claims, while joinder of plaintiff's
claims was restricted by categories.293 Further, he pointed out that if the
case grew too complex due to unlimited joinder of causes, the causes
could be severed for trial.294
Friedenthal's work was utilized by the California Law Revision
Commission (Commission) when it prepared its Recommendation and
Study Relating to Counterclaims and Cross-Complaints, Joinder of Causes
of Action, and Related Provisions (Recommendation) in 1970.295 The
Recommendation echoed Friedenthal's belief that limiting joinder by ar-
bitrary categories was inefficient.296  The Commission recommended
mandatory joinder of plaintiff's claims when the claims arose out of "the
same transaction or occurrence. '29 7 This proposal was consistent with
the rule requiring defendants to join all counterclaims that arose from
the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claims.298
The California Legislature repealed Section 427 in 1971.299 Its re-
291. Id.
292. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 438 (repealed 1971) (counterclaims), 442 (repealed 1971)
(cross-complaints). In 1971, California joinder was restructured; current joinder-of-claims re-
quirements are codified at Sections 426.10-426.60,427.10, and 428.10-428.80 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure. In 1971, the distinction between counterclaims and cross-complaints
was abolished. 1971 Cal. Stat. 372, 378, ch. 244, § 23 (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 428.80 (West 1973)). See infra notes 299-307 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
1971 changes in California joinder procedure.
293. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 5.
294. Id.
295. Recommendation, supra note 227. The Commission included Professor Friedenthal's
study as part of its presentation to the Governor. Friedenthal, supra note 15, reprinted in
Recommendation, supra note 227, at 581-619.
296. Recommendation, supra note 227, at 508-09. The Recommendation cited a resolution
prepared by the San Francisco Bar Association, which stated that the joinder statutes were
"unnecessarily difficult for the practicing attorney to follow without guesswork and extensive
legal research .. .[and that they were] highly unpredictable in their effect-an intolerable
situation." Id. at 509 n.8.
297. Id. at 510. The Commission also submitted proposed legislation revising the joinder
statutes. See id. at 545-56. One proposed statute, Section 426.20 would have required
mandatory joinder of plaintiff's "related causes of action." Id. at 545. The legislature did not
adopt the proposed section.
298. Id. at 510.
299. 1971 Cal. Stat. 372, 378, ch. 244, § 22.
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placement, the current California statutory provision for "[fjoinder of
other causes of action by plaintiff," was codified at Section 427.10 (a).3"
Section 427.10(a) states that "[a] plaintiff who in a complaint.., alleges
a cause of action against one or more defendants may unite with such
cause any other causes which he has . . . against any of such
defendants."30o
The Legislative Committee Comment to Section 427.10 noted that
the new statute abolished the arbitrary joinder categories.30 2 Section
427.10 reflects the principle that once a litigant is a proper party to the
action, his adversaries may join any other claims that they have against
him.3  Possible undesirable effects resulting from broad joinder can be
cured by severance of causes or issues for trial.3 4
Other changes were made in the California joinder statutes in 1971.
The counterclaim was abolished and became a variety of the cross-com-
plaint.3"5 Any claim by any party against any other party, except for the
plaintiff's original claim against the defendant, may be filed as a cross-
complaint. 30 6  A cross-complaint is now compulsory under Section
426.30 if it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim
asserted against the party filing the cross-complaint.30 7
In sum, the principles governing joinder in California have changed
markedly since the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted in 1851. Origi-
nally, the plaintiff could join claims only if they fell within the specific
300. Id. § 23 (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427.10(a) (West 1973)).
301. Id. (emphasis added).
302. REPORT OF SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY ON SENATE BILL 201, SENATE JOURNAL,
Apr. 1, 1971, 884, 887 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 428.80 (West 1973).
306. See id. § 428.10; COMMUNICATION FROM ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY ON
SENATE BILL 201, ASSEMBLY JOURNAL, 5236, 5243 (June 16, 1971).
307. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 426.30 (West 1973). Compulsory cross-complaints are gov-
erned by the California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 426.10-426.60. Section 426.10 sets
forth definitions used in these subsections:
(a) "Complaint" means a complaint or cross-complaint.
(b) "Plaintiff" means a person who files a complaint or cross-complaint.
(c) "Related cause of action" means a cause of action which arises out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of
action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint.
Id. § 426.10 (West 1973).
Section 426.30 provides, in effect, that if X files a claim against Y, Y has a potential claim
against X which is a "related cause of action" (i.e., arises out of the same transaction as X's
claim), and Y fails to file a cross-complaint against X at the time Y serves his answer, then Y
waives his right to assert the "related causes of action" at a later time. See id. § 426.30. This
rule will not be applied if the court has no jurisdiction over Y, or if Y does not file an answer.
Id.
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Code classes3 08 This rule was modified by amendments which allowed
joinder of certain claims if they arose from the same transaction or oc-
currence as the original claim.3 °9 In 1971, the Code joinder statute was
repealed,310 and the Code categories abolished.3"' Under the current join-
der rules: (1) the plaintiff can join all claims he has against the defend-
ant;312 (2) the defendant can assert any claims he has against the plaintiff
by filing a cross-complaint; 313 (3) the defendant's cross-claims are com-
pulsory if they arise out of the same transaction as the plaintiff's
claim;314 and (4) the plaintiff must assert any remaining claims he has
against the defendant, or waive them, if they arise out of the same trans-
action or occurrence as the defendant's cross-claim.315 Accordingly,
joinder is no longer determined by reference to categories;316 any con-
straints making joinder compulsory are determined by whether claims
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.317 Tracing the source of
multiple claims to the same transaction or occurrence is accomplished by
evaluating facts.318
B. Primary Rights and Res Judicata
Prior to the enactment of the Codes in 1848,319 the procedures in-
volving pleading, amendment, joinder, and res judicata were harmoni-
ous. Subsequent to 1971, they are dissonant. California's persistence in
defining a cause of action in terms of primary rights for purposes of res
judicata is out of step with developments in related areas. At common
law, pleading, amendment, and joinder were restricted by reference to
the legal categories established by the forms of action.320 At that time, a
308. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971).
309. See 1907 Cal. Stat. 705, 705-06, ch. 32, § 2; 1915 Cal. Stat. 30, ch. 28, § 1; 1931 Cal.
Stat. 396, ch. 224, § 1.
310. 1971 Cal. Stat. 372, 378, ch. 244, § 22.
311. SENATE REPORT, supra note 302, at 887.
312. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427.10 (West 1973).
313. Id. § 428.10 (West Supp. 1989).
314. Id. §§ 426.10, 426.30 (West 1973).
315. Id.
316. SENATE REPORT, supra note 302, at 887.
317. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 426.10, 426.30 (West 1973).
318. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, § 24 (2). See supra note 11
for the text of Section 24 and infra notes 568-73 and accompanying text for a discussion
thereof.
319. 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, ch. 379, §§ 1-391. California adopted the Code in 1851. 1851
Cal. Stat. 51, ch. 5, §§ 1-649 (codified as amended in scattered sections of CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 307-1058 (1872)). See supra note 217-31 and accompanying text.
320. J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, supra note 32, § 8, at 39; B. SHIPMAN, supra note 174, § 163,
at 296; Comment, supra note 174, at 102.
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cause of action that was defined in terms of legal categories for res judi-
cata purposes made more sense because related procedures were gov-
erned by the same categories.32 1
However, in California today, the adequacy of a complaint is judged
by whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of
action.322 A pleading may be amended if the change arises from the
"same general set of facts" that gave rise to the original pleading. 23
Joinder of the plaintiff's claims is permissive,3 24 and joinder of cross-
complaints is compulsory if the cross-complaints arise out of the same
transaction as the original claim.3 25 The limits of the same transaction is
determined by reference to facts.326 The legal category limitation has no
current relevance to these procedures.
California's primary rights definition of a cause of action for res
judicata purposes has not kept pace with these developments. The
preclusive effect of a lawsuit in California is still determined by how
many of the plaintiff's primary rights were violated by the defendant.327
This reasoning is reminiscent of the distinctions drawn under the com-
mon-law forms of action,328 and the differences between "forms" or
"causes" of action are not factually ascertainable. 329 By contrast, most
jurisdictions bar a second action if it arises from the same transaction or
occurrence involved in the first suit.330 In such jurisdictions, a cause of
action for purposes of res judicata is defined in terms of facts.33'
321. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 11.2.
322. 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 332, at 383 (citing Semole v. Sansoucie, 28 Cal. App. 3d
714, 721, 104 Cal. Rptr. 897, 901 (1972)); see supra notes 232-43 and accompanying text.
323. 5 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 1162, at 579; see supra notes 244-54 and accompanying
text.
324. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427.10 (West 1973); see supra notes 255-318 and accompa-
nying text.
325. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 426.10, 426.30 (West 1973); see supra note 307 and accom-
panying text.
326. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, § 24(2). See supra note 11
for text of Section 24 and infra notes 568-73 and accompanying text for a discussion thereof.
327. Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 955, 603 P.2d 58, 72, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 155
(1979); see also 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 23 and authorities cited therein.
328. M. KANE, supra note 6, § 14.4, at 624.
329. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, § 24 comment a.
330. Comment, supra note 11, at 367-68; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra
note 11, § 24 comment a ("The present trend is to see the claim in factual terms and to make it
coterminous with the transaction .... ").
331. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, § 24(2). See supra note I 1
for the definition of a cause of action proposed in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.
Professor Clark thought that the fact-based "same transaction" definition of a cause of
action for res judicata purposes was the definition most compatible with the code pleading
system.
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Thus, California's definition of cause of action for purposes of res
judicata is not harmonious with other aspects of California procedure.
Disharmony itself is not sufficient reason for change. However, when
disharmony produces confusion, change should be considered to elimi-
nate the confusion.
IV. THE INHERENT AMBIGUITY OF THE PRIMARY RIGHTS THEORY
One factor that contributes to the confusion created by California's
continued adherence to primary rights is the theory's inherent ambiguity.
Although most of California's recognized primary rights can be traced to
the categories set forth in the former joinder statute,332 courts have de-
parted from those categories and granted "primary" status to other
rights. 3 ' However, nothing within the primary rights theory itself tells a
judge whether a given right is indeed "primary." '334 As a result, in cases
where the existence of a particular primary right is at issue, the argu-
ments for and against the "primary" nature of the right can be consistent
with the primary rights theory.335
The ambiguity of the primary rights theory can be a short-term ad-
vantage when judges are faced with conflicting obligations. Judges must
adhere to the primary rights theory, but they also must respect the policy
of judicial economy.336 The fact that a primary right can be character-
ized broadly or narrowly allows judges to fulfill both obligations. A
broad characterization of a primary right will most likely give a plaintiff
The codifiers seem to have had in mind the cause of action as consisting of facts
which should afford ground or occasion for the court to give judicial relief.... This
is shown by their emphasis upon "the facts" as "constituting the cause of action" and
upon their attempt to get away from the legal subdivisions of the previous systems
and to keep legal theories of recovery out of the pleadings proper.
C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 19, at 137.
332. Holmes v. David Bricker, Inc., 70 Cal. 2d 786, 788, 452 P.2d 647, 649, 76 Cal. Rptr.
431, 433 (1969). See supra note 49 for the text of former Section 427 and notes 47-57 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship between primary rights and former
Section 427's categories.
333. See, eg., Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 750 F.2d
731, 738 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985) (applying California law) (court
found primary right to attend integrated schools); see supra notes 99-102 for a discussion of
NAACP.
334. C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 19, at 135-36 & n.163. See infra notes 345-411 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Tooke v. Allen, 85 Cal. App. 2d 230, 192 P.2d 804 (1948),
where the court found violation of the broad primary right of peaceable possession of real
property, instead of violations of narrower separate primary rights of injury to person and to
property.
335. C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 19, at 135-36 & n.163.
336. Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 Cal. 2d 891, 894, 151 P.2d 846, 848 (1944); 4 B. WITKIN, supra
note 1, § 34.
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only one cause of action, 337 thereby curtailing the opportunity to bring
successive suits. Thus, a broad characterization decreases the number of
lawsuits brought and furthers the goal of judicial economy.
By contrast, a narrow characterization of a primary right yields a
greater number of causes of action,338 thereby increasing a plaintiff's op-
portunity for multiple suits. The increased opportunities for litigation
defeat the goal of judicial economy. For these reasons, if judges can
characterize a primary right broadly, they further judicial economy and
still remain true to the primary rights theory.
In some cases, the primary right has been interpreted so that it en-
compasses the entire transaction or occurrence that gave rise to the
claim.339 Thus, the inherent ambiguity of the primary rights theory al-
lows lawyers and judges to employ "same transaction" criteria while
paying lip service to primary rights.
The malleable nature of the primary rights theory has been illus-
trated in several California cases. 34 In the first case discussed below, the
court had to determine whether one or several of the plaintiff's rights
were violated where the defendant's conduct constituted a continuing
wrong.341 In the second case, the issue was whether the plaintiffs had a
broad right grounded in contract as opposed to two separate rights
grounded in tort.34 2 In the third case, the court had to decide whether
the plaintiff's successive claims for breach of contract and infliction of
emotional distress constituted violations of separate primary rights or
whether the emotional distress was merely a consequential damage of the
alleged breach of contract.343
337. C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 19, at 135-36 & n.163.
338. Id.
339. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Board of Trustees, 783 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1182 (1986) (applying California law); Tooke v. Allen, 85 Cal. App. 2d 230, 192 P.2d
804 (1948). See infra notes 468-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of Takahashi and
notes 345-411 and accompanying text for a discussion of Tooke.
340. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Board of Trustees, 783 F.2d 848 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1182 (1986) (applying California law); Holmes v. David Bricker, Inc., 70 Cal. 2d 786, 452
P.2d 647, 76 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1969); Tooke v. Allen, 85 Cal. App. 2d 230, 192 P.2d 804 (1948).
See infra notes 468-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of Takahashi, notes 412-67 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Holmes, and notes 345-411 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Tooke.
341. Tooke v. Allen, 85 Cal. App. 2d 230, 192 P.2d 804 (1948).
342. Holmes v. David Bricker, Inc., 70 Cal. 2d 786, 452 P. 2d 647, 76 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1969).
343. Takahashi v. Board of Trustees, 783 F.2d 848 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182
(1986) (applying California law).
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A. Continuing Wrong
Under the primary rights theory, it is not always clear whether a
defendant's continuing tortious conduct violates one or several of the
plaintiff's primary rights. 3" This issue was debated in Tooke v. Allen.345
The Tooke case involved delimiting a cause of action for purposes of
pleading, as opposed to res judicata.346 Nevertheless, the Tooke court
dealt with the scope of the plaintiff's rights, and these limits are also
applicable in the res judicata context.347
The Tooke case involved a landlord-tenant dispute.348 Tooke had
been a tenant in an apartment house for several years when Allen
purchased the building.349 Allen sued Tooke for the amount allegedly
due from a rent increase,350 and the lawsuit was resolved in Tooke's
favor.311 Tooke then filed an action against Allen for damages, alleging
that Allen had embarked upon a continuous "campaign of annoyance"
calculated to force her out of the apartment, thereby violating her right
to peaceful possession of her home.352
The trial court found that Allen performed or directed a series of
acts which seriously inconvenienced Tooke.353 Despite a special lock
that Tooke installed on her door to keep him out, Allen nevertheless
broke into the apartment, removed her typewriter, clothing, and other
items, and scattered her papers and unfinished manuscripts on the
floor.354 He reduced her hot water, shut off her gas several times, and
disconnected her telephone.355 He threatened her "with death or serious
bodily harm" and pushed her outside her apartment.35 6 Allen's conduct
continued for the three years immediately preceding the commencement
of the suit.
35 7
Allen attempted to demur, arguing that each incident should be con-
344. See 4 B. WrrKIN, supra note 1, § 54 and cases cited therein.
345. 85 Cal. App. 2d 230, 192 P.2d 804 (1948).
346. The meaning of the term "cause of action" can vary depending upon the procedural
context in which it is used. I AM. JUR. 2D, Actions § 1 (1962). See supra note 1.
347. Comment, supra note 3, at 160-61.
348. Tooke, 85 Cal. App. 2d at 232, 192 P.2d at 806.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 232-33, 192 P.2d at 806.
353. Id. at 232-34, 192 P.2d at 806-07.
354. Id. at 233, 192 P.2d at 806.
355. Id., 192 P.2d at 806-07.
356. Id., 192 P.2d at 807.
357. Id.
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sidered in isolation.358 He argued that Tooke should have pleaded the
existence of separate contracts, and breaches thereof, for each of her util-
ity services.359 Despite the fact that Allen customarily furnished tele-
phone service in the apartment house, he argued that no contract existed
for this service; instead, it was "a mere favor that could be discontinued
at any time. '360 Likewise, Allen minimized the importance of his failure
to provide Tooke with hot water, asking what difference it made that she
had to take cold baths and was unable to use her kitchen. 36  He also
insisted that shutting off the gas was trivial, since Tooke's neighbors al-
lowed her to use their kitchens.362 He claimed that although he seized
her clothing as a lien for allegedly unpaid rent, the production of the
clothes at trial showed that they were not damaged; therefore, she suf-
fered no damage as a result of their seizure.363 He argued that breaking
the lock she had installed was a "trivial matter" and did not constitute an
eviction.3" Additionally, he claimed that the commotion caused by his
entries into her apartment did not interfere with her peaceful possession
of the premises.365 He also argued that the statute of limitations had run
on a cause of action for injury to and taking of personal property.366
By this "painstaking procedure," Allen attempted to persuade the
court that his actions caused merely separate "minor inconveniences.
'367
He argued that had she properly pleaded her causes of action, they
would have been divided into several separate causes.368 Thus separated,
the damage element of each cause was insignificant and therefore not
recoverable.3 69 Further, he argued that the statute of limitations barred
recovery on the claim relating to detention of her personal property.
37 0
If Tooke was unable to recover on any separate cause, Allen would be
"guiltless of any wrongdoing whatever."' 37 1
358. Id. Allen characterized his actions as "'[sluccessive separate torts.'" Id. at 234, 192
P.2d at 807.
359. Id. at 235, 192 P.2d at 808.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. Allen did not contest the trial court's finding that Tooke owed no rent at the time
Allen took her clothes. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. According to Allen, Tooke's losses were so insignificant that they were "too incon-
sequential to engage the time of the court." Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 235-36, 192 P.2d at 808.
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Under a narrow application of the primary rights theory, the court
could have accepted Allen's argument.372 The court could have found
that Tooke had several causes of action, including those stemming from
violations of her rights to be free from injury to person, to be free from
injury to property, and to recover personal property.373 However, the
court decided that Allen's contention was "an untenable theory ' 3 7 4 be-
cause Tooke's cause of action "was not for injuries to either person or
property in a strict sense., 3 75 Instead, one right, the right to peaceful
possession, had been violated.376 The right to peaceful possession was
based on a property right, and "interference with personal rights would
not be an unusual consequence" of violating the right to peaceful posses-
sion.3 77 The court stated that proof of violation of personal rights, viola-
tion of property rights, or both, would not alter the basic nature of a
cause of action grounded in the right to peaceful possession.378 The
court added that Allen's course of persecution was a single continuing
offense.379
In terms of justice to the parties involved in this case, most would
agree that the court reached the correct result. However, in terms of the
primary rights theory, the correctness of the decision is not clear.3 8 ° One
commentator stated that the Tooke decision was "a substantial deviation
from the primary rights theory as previously applied by the California
courts.
3 8 1
The commentator believed that the Tooke decision was inconsistent
with Lamb v. Harbaugh.382 In Lamb, the defendants forcibly entered the
Lamb dwelling while Mrs. Lamb and her daughters were inside.383
When inside, the defendants threatened and "maltreated" the occupants,
372. See Comment, supra note 3, at 161.
373. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971) which classified causes of action
based on separate rights. See McNulty v. Copp, 125 Cal. App. 2d 697, 708-09, 271 P.2d 90, 98
(1954) (distinguishing causes of action for recovery of real and personal property); Schermer-
horn v. Los Angeles Pac. R.R. Co., 18 Cal. App. 454, 123 P. 351 (1912) (distinguishing causes
of action for bodily injury and property damage). See also supra notes 63-114 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of primary rights recognized in California.
374. Tooke, 85 Cal. App. 2d at 236, 192 P.2d at 808.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 235-36, 192 P.2d at 808.
378. Id.
379. Id., 192 P.2d at 808-09.
380. Comment, supra note 3, at 159.
381. Id.
382. 105 Cal. 680, 39 P. 56 (1895); see Comment, supra note 3, at 160.
383. Lamb, 105 Cal. at 687-88, 39 P. at 56.
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causing them to fear for their lives,384 and forcing them to leave their
home and seek other shelter.385 Lamb sued the defendants for $50,000,
claiming that she had suffered disgrace, humiliation, and permanent im-
pairment of her health.386 The defendants demurred on the ground that
Lamb had four causes of action-injuries to property, personal injury to
Lamb, personal injury to Lamb's daughters, and injury to Lamb's char-
acter.38 7 Under former Section 427,388 the joinder statute in effect at that
time, these different causes of action could not be joined in the same
lawsuit.3 9 The trial court overruled the demurrer, 390 but the supreme
court reversed.39' The supreme court rejected Lamb's contention that
she stated only a single cause of action in trespass upon real property.
392
Took was also inconsistent with Ross v. Goins,393 which involved
facts almost identical to those in Tooke. In Ross, a landlord broke into
the premises occupied by his tenant.3 94 The tenant filed an action against
the landlord for unlawful removal from the premises. 395 The complaint
alleged various acts of destruction and conversion of the tenant's per-
sonal property, as well as several acts of violence.396 The court stated
that many of the acts alleged would constitute valid causes of action if
they had been sued upon independently, but when they were "averred as
a particularization of the act of removal of the plaintiff from the prem-
ises, they fail to have any meaning."3 97 Thus, the holding in Tooke was
diametrically opposed to the holding in Ross.
The commentator concluded that the outcome in the Tooke case
was not consistent with these California cases that had followed the pri-
mary rights theory.398 The commentator noted that the Tooke court
could have reached the same result in a way that avoided inconsis-
tency.399 A tenant has the benefit of an implied covenant of quiet enjoy-
384. Id. at 688, 39 P. at 56.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id., 39 P. at 57.
388. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971).
389. Lamb, 105 Cal. at 689, 39 P. at 57.
390. Id. at 688, 39 P. at 57.
391. Id. at 689, 39 P. at 57.
392. Id.
393. 51 Cal. App. 412, 197 P. 132 (1921).
394. Id. at 413, 197 P. at 133.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Comment, supra note 3, at 159.
399. Id. at 161.
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ment of the premises.' ° This benefit is based on the lease, which is a
contract.4° 1 A cause of action in contract is grounded in a primary right
separate from those primary rights which give rise to tort actions.4 2 The
Tooke court could have found that Tooke's single right to quiet enjoy-
ment was based on contract.4°3 However, the court did not use a con-
tract theory.4°4 Instead, the court treated Allen's repeated transgressions
as a "continuing offense."'"' 5 According to the commentator, the charac-
terization of Allen's acts as torts brings the Tooke case within the pur-
view of the earlier cases. 4 6
However, despite this commentator's valid observations, the Tooke
court's interpretation can also be reconciled with the primary rights the-
ory because there are no standards contained in the primary rights the-
ory which indicate how broad or narrow a primary right must be." 7 The
Tooke court characterized the "cause of action" much more broadly than
earlier courts had done when deciding cases with similar facts." The
court declined to find that Tooke had only the narrow rights to personal
security and property security. 4 9 Instead, the court found a broad right
to enjoy property, and Allen's individual transgressions were merely dif-
ferent "consequence[s]" of his wrong.41° Thus, the court's interpretation
is arguably consistent with the primary rights theory. However, defend-
ant Allen's interpretation was also consistent.411 Perhaps the court char-
acterized Tooke's right broadly because the court desired to reach a just
result. Whatever its motivation, the court was able to "save" Tooke's
cause of action by manipulating the primary rights theory.
400. Georgeous v. Lewis, 20 Cal. App. 255, 258, 128 P. 768, 769 (1912); see also Comment,
supra note 3, at 161. Causes of action in contract were separate from tort actions under Cali-
fornia's former joinder statute. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971).
Holmes v. David Bricker, Inc., 70 Cal. 2d 786, 452 P.2d 647, 76 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1969)
illustrated how a cause of action in contract enveloped two potential tort actions. See infra
notes 412-67 for a discussion of Holmes.
401. Id.
402. Former Section 427 of the California Code of Civil Procedure categorized causes of
action based on primary rights. Holmes, 70 Cal. 2d at 788, 452 P.2d at 649, 76 Cal. Rptr. at
433. Contract causes of action fell within the first category, while tort causes of action fell
within the remaining six categories. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971).
403. Comment, supra note 3, at 161.
404. Tooke, 85 Cal. App. 2d at 236-37, 192 P.2d at 808-09.
405. Id.
406. Comment, supra note 3 at 161.
407. C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 19, at 135-36 & n.163.
408. See supra notes 381-98 and accompanying text.
409. Tooke, 85 Cal. App. 2d at 236, 192 P.2d at 808.
'410. Id.
411. See supra notes 372-73 and accompanying text.
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B. Contract and Tort
By contrast, Justice Traynor did not "save" the plaintiffs' cause of
action in Holmes v. David Bricker, Inc.412 In Holmes, Mr. and Mrs.
Holmes, purchased a used automobile from David Bricker, Inc. on Au-
gust 24, 1962.113 The contract of sale included an express warranty that
the car was "in good operating condition" and would remain so for thirty
days or 1000 miles.4" 4 During the warranty period, the car's brakes
failed and caused an accident. 415 The plaintiffs were both injured, and
the car was damaged.4" 6
Mr. and Mrs. Holmes filed an action to recover for their personal
injuries.417 The complaint alleged breach of express warranties, breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability, violation of the Vehicle Code
section which required the dealer to test the brakes, negligence, and
fraudulent representation.418 Thejury rendered a verdict for plaintiffs.419
While the personal injury action was still pending, the plaintiffs filed
a second action to recover for the damage to their car,420 alleging breach
of the express warranty. 421 The trial court sustained the seller's demur-
rer to the property damage claim on the ground that the plaintiffs
"'could and should have'" asserted the property damage claim in the
first suit.422 On appeal, Justice Traynor affirmed, stating that the claim
for breach of express warranty "was identical with the [breach of express
warranty claim] in the [first] personal injury complaint except for the
damages alleged.
42 3
The plaintiffs argued that under California's primary rights theory,
conduct which simultaneously causes both personal injury and property
damage gives rise to two separate causes of action: "one for violation of
the right to freedom from legally impermissible interference with the in-
tegrity of the person and one for violation of the right to quiet enjoyment
412. 70 Cal. 2d 786, 452 P.2d 647, 76 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1969).
413. Id. at 787, 452 P.2d at 648, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
414. Id.
415. Id. The car "crashed into a fixed object along a downgrade on a mountain road .... "
Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 787-88, 452 P.2d at 648-49, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 432-33.
419. Id. at 788, 452 P.2d at 649, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
420. Id.
421. Id. Mr. and Mrs. Holmes also alleged fraudulent misrepresentation in the second suit,
but the parties stipulated to the dismissal of that claim. Id. They did not plead negligence in
the property damage action. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
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of property."' 24 Justice Traynor acknowledged the correctness of this
assertion and cited numerous supporting authorities.42 However, he dis-
tinguished the Holmes' situation by noting that they did not plead a
cause of action for tortious injury to their automobile.426 Instead, they
alleged breach of the express written warranty in the contract of sale.4 2 7
That breach was the "identical breach of warranty" that they had alleged
in the first suit.428 Thus, the crucial question for Justice Traynor was
"whether a single breach of the express warranty gave rise to two causes
of action when it resulted in injury to both the persons and the property
of plaintiffs."4 2 9 He concluded that the breach only gave rise to one
cause of action because "[t]he warranty pleaded in [the Holmes'] case
was essentially contractual in character. ' 430 To support this position,
Justice Traynor noted that the warranty "did not arise by operation of
law," but was "subject to negotiation and modification" by the parties. 431
Justice Traynor stated that under these circumstances, all damages for a
single breach of contract must be recovered in a single action.4 32
Arguably, Justice Traynor's conclusion is acceptable under the pri-
mary rights theory. Mr. and Mrs. Holmes pleaded breach of express
warranty, and a warranty is part of a sales contract.43 3 Under the Cali-
fornia joinder statute in effect when the Holmes case was decided, con-
tract was a category of cause of action separate from torts.4 34 According
to Justice Traynor, if breach of contract, or some sub-species thereof, is
the only cause of action pleaded, the plaintiff must allege all injuries that
arise out of that breach in one lawsuit.435
Yet, due to the ambiguity of the primary rights theory, the issue can
be analyzed differently: Mr. and Mrs. Holmes suffered violations of
their separate primary rights to be free of injuries to person and to prop-
erty, and breach of warranty was merely the theory of recovery.436 Cali-
fornia courts have often recognized that in determining the number of
424. Id.
425. Id. at 788-89, 452 P.2d at 649-50, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 433-34.
426. Id. at 789, 452 P.2d at 650, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 789-90, 452 P.2d at 650, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
429. Id. at 790, 452 P.2d at 650, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 434 (emphasis added).
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 789-90, 452 P.2d at 650, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
434. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971); see supra note 49 for the text of former
Section 427.
435. Holmes, 70 Cal. 2d at 790, 452 P.2d at 650, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
436. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 121, § 101, at 708-09; see infra notes 442-55 and
accompanying text for a discussion of theories of recovery for breach of warranty.
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primary rights violated, the most significant factor is the harm suf-
fered. 37 Mr. and Mrs. Holmes clearly suffered two kinds of harm-bod-
ily injury and property damage438 -a distinction that California courts
have traditionally recognized. 39 Under the former California joinder
statute that was in effect when the Holmes case was decided, bodily in-
jury and property damages fell into separate classes of causes of ac-
tion.' 0 If the number of primary rights violated is determined based
upon the actual harm suffered, Justice Traynor's decision to subsume the
Holmes' personal and property injuries under the umbrella of breach of
contract was incorrect.
In reaching his conclusion, Justice Traynor posited that the Holmes'
warranty was "essentially contractual in character.""' However, the au-
thors of Prosser and Keeton on Torts suggest that a warranty is a hybrid
between contract and tort." 2 While a warranty is often part of the con-
tract itself, and its terms can be negotiated," 3 the manufacturer and
seller nonetheless have a duty to act so that the product does not injure
either the buyer or third persons. 4 In Pomeroy's terms, the duty is
owed to "all mankind."" 5 A duty thus owed sounds in tort, and it can-
not be obliterated by the terms of a contact.
446
The authors of Prosser and Keeton on Torts' 7 distinguish between
personal injuries to purchasers of defective products, and injury to the
437. See Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 750 F.2d 731,
738 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985) (applying California law) ("ITihe single
most important factor in determining whether a single course of conduct has violated more
than one primary right is whether plaintiff suffered injury to more than one interest.");
Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 954, 603 P.2d 58, 72, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 155 (1979)
("[T]he significant factor is the harm suffered; that the same facts are involved in both suits is
not conclusive."); Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 795, 543 P.2d 593, 594, 126 Cal. Rptr.
225, 226 (1975) (plaintiff's successive suits asserted distinct theories of recovery, but second
suit was barred because plaintiff only sustained single bodily injury); Peiser v. Mettler, 50 Cal.
2d 594, 605, 328 P.2d 953, 959 (1958) ("The cause of action is based upon the injury to the
plaintiff and not the particular legal theory of the defendant's wrongful act."); Lippert v. Bai-
ley, 241 Cal. App. 2d 376, 382, 50 Cal. Rptr. 478, 481 (1966) ("A single cause of action may
not be maintained... in separate suits as the plaintiff has suffered but one injury.") (emphasis
added); Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 13.
438. Holmes, 70 Cal. 2d at 787, 452 P.2d at 648, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
439. Id. at 788-89, 452 P.2d. at 649, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
440. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971).
441. Holmes, 70 Cal. 2d at 790, 452 P.2d at 650, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
442. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 121, § 101, at 708.
443. Holmes, 70 Cal. 2d at 790, 452 P.2d at 650, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
444. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 121, § 101, at 708.
445. 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 33, § 94, at 105. See supra notes
21-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pomeroy's primary rights theory.
446. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 121, § 96, at 682.
447. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 121.
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defective product itself that causes economic harm to the purchaser."
Today, if a defective product causes personal injury to a purchaser, the
purchaser can recover from the seller under three theories: strict liability
in tort, strict liability for breach of warranty, and negligence in tort.449
The seller's liability is "based ... on policy considerations-and not on a
manifested intent to guarantee- [and therefore it] ought not to be dis-
claimable by contract .... ,450
Different principles govern injury to the defective product itself.
Although tort principles are arguably applicable to these kinds of
losses, 45 1 the authors of Prosser and Keeton on Torts argue that parties to
a sales transaction should be free to allocate the risk of loss to the prod-
uct itself under the terms of the contract.452 If products are defective and
do not perform as expected, purchasers may suffer economic harm be-
cause either they cannot use the product as they intended, or because
they incur unanticipated extra expense to repair the product. These
problems come within the purview of disappointed expectations, which
are the proper subject of a breach of contract cause of action.453
If the distinction set forth in Prosser and Keeton on Torts is applied
to the Holmes case, the plaintiffs would have had two causes of action:
one for personal injury and one for breach of contract. In Holmes, the
first action for personal injury should have been understood to be
grounded in tort. The seller owed a common-law duty to the purchasers
to sell them a safe car regardless of the existence of a written warranty.454
The seller also had a statutory duty under the California Vehicle Code to
inspect the brakes,455 which was also independent of any express war-
ranty. Thus, the seller's duty to Mr. and Mrs. Holmes did not arise
448. Id. § 96, at 709.
449. Id. at 708. A purchaser may encounter difficulty proving negligence against a seller
because the purchaser will often not have access to information regarding the seller's handling
of the product prior to the sale. Id. § 98, at 692-93. For this reason, alternative strict liability
theories-tort and warranty-developed to help purchasers protect themselves. See id.
§§ 95A & 97 for a short history of the development of the warranty theory of recovery. The
theory of strict liability in tort began to develop in 1960. Id. § 96, at 689. Prior to that time,
the theory of breach of warranty served as a bridge between the purchaser's harm and the
seller's act when the purchaser could not prove negligence. Id. § 101, at 708. The defendant's
liability was still grounded in tort as opposed to contract. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 708-09.
452. Id. at 709.
453. See generally id. § 95A.
454. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 121, § 96, at 708; see also supra notes 442-46 and
accompanying text.
455. Holmes, 70 Cal. 2d at 787, 452 P.2d at 648-49, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 432-33.
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purely out of the contract. Even though the theory of recovery pleaded
was breach of warranty, the cause of action was actually in tort.
The second action for property damage to the car itself could be
characterized as either a tort or a contract action.456 Either way, under
the primary rights theory, the second suit could have stated a separate
cause of action had the first suit been properly characterized as a tort
action. If the second action was found to be a tort action based on injury
to property, it would be distinct from the personal injury cause of action
litigated in the first suit. 7 If the second action was found to be
grounded in contract, it would be distinct from the personal injury action
based on tort.s
As a practical matter, it probably would have been difficult for Mr.
and Mrs. Holmes to prove that the seller was negligent or that he actu-
ally failed to inspect the brakes pursuant to the vehicle code statute.4" 9
The Holmes opinion does not provide much litigation history, but the
first action for bodily injury did allege negligence as well as breach of
warranty.460 The first action was filed on September 6, 1963.461 The sec-
ond action was filed on February 3, 1966, approximately two and one
half years later.4 62 Conceivably, by the time Mr. and Mrs. Holmes filed
the second action, they knew that they could not prove negligence
against Bricker, and that a negligence theory of recovery would not suc-
ceed the second time around. Had the incident taken place at a later
date, the plaintiffs may have pleaded and prevailed under the theory of
strict liability in tort.4 63 However, since that theory was in its early
stages of development when the action was brought,464 Mr. and Mrs.
Holmes (and their attorney) may have believed that the breach of war-
ranty theory was the most effective theory available. In any event, the
choice of a theory of recovery is a tactical concern which does not change
the fact that Mr. and Mrs. Holmes suffered two kinds of harm which, in
California, give rise to two causes of action.
Thus, under the primary rights theory, the bodily injury and prop-
erty damage suffered by Mr. and Mrs. Holmes could have been viewed in
456. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 121, § 96, at 708-09.
457. Holmes, 70 Cal. 2d at 788-89, 452 P.2d at 649, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
458. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1971).
459. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 121, § 98, at 692-93; see supra note 449.
460. Holmes, 70 Cal. 2d at 787, 452 P.2d at 648-49, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 432-33.
461. Id., 452 P.2d at 648, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
462. Id. at 788, 452 P.2d at 649, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
463. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 121, § 96, at 689.
464. Id.
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two ways, 4 65 producing opposite results for the plaintiffs. If the second
suit for property damage was seen as an attempt to obtain additional
damages for a single breach of contract, as the Holmes court found, the
second suit would be barred.466 On the other hand, the second suit could
be regarded as a separate cause of action grounded in the primary rights
of property or contract, whereas the first suit was grounded in bodily
injury. Nothing in the primary rights theory provides guidance as to
which interpretation is correct.467
C. Primary Rights and Consequential Damages
While Justice Traynor manipulated the primary rights theory by
subsuming the right to personal security and the right to property secur-
ity under a broader right grounded in contract, other courts have treated
tort claims as merely elements of consequential damages of the contract
465. See Purcell v. Colonial Ins. Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 807, 97 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1971). In that
case, plaintiff Purcell had been involved in an auto accident, and his insurance company re-
jected the accident victims' demand to settle their claim against Purcell within Purcell's policy
limits of $20,000. Id. at 810, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 875. A jury rendered ajudgment against Purcell
for $35,000. Id. at 811, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 876. Purcell filed an action against the insurance
company for wrongful failure to settle. Id. at 809, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 875. He assigned this cause
of action to the accident victims. Id. at 810, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 875. Subsequently, Purcell
brought a second action, claiming that he had experienced pain and suffering as the result of
the insurance company's failure to settle. Id. at 813, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 877. He argued that the
first cause of action, the one he had assigned, was for the recovery of monetary losses. Id. The
second action for his own "pain and suffering" was grounded in personal injury. Id. The
court held that Purcell had split his cause of action because his right to both kinds of damages
were traceable to the contract between Purcell and the insurance company. Id., 97 Cal. Rptr.
at 878.
The Purcell case is more clearly consistent with the primary rights theory than the
Holmes case. In Holmes, the seller owed a duty to Mr. and Mrs. Holmes to sell them a safe
automobile, and this duty existed independently from a contract. See PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 121, § 96, at 683; see also supra notes 442-46 and accompanying text. By contrast,
absent a contract between Purcell and the insurance company, the insurance company would
have owed no duty to Purcell. Still, one commentator has stated that Purcell is inconsistent
with the primary rights theory. See Comment, Wrongful Failure to Settle an Insurance Claim:
The Case of the Missing Cause of Action, 20 UCLA L. REv. 1048 (1973).
The final irony that emerges from Holmes is that the case has been cited for the proposi-
tion that injuries to person and to property constitute invasions of separate primary rights. See
Shelton v. Superior Ct., 56 Cal. App. 3d 66, 81, 128 Cal. Rptr. 454, 464 (1976); Annotation,
supra note 11, at 687 (1983). Indeed, the Holmes opinion specifically states that "causes of
action for injuries to person and property are separate." Holmes, 70 Cal. 2d at 789, 452 P.2d
at 649, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 433. However, Justice Traynor thought that the plaintiffs' decision to
describe their injuries in terms of breach of warranty, as opposed to "tortious injury to their
automobile," was more important than the actual injuries suffered. Id. at 789-90, 452 P.2d at
650, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
466. Holmes, 70 Cal. 2d at 790, 452 P.2d at 650, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
467. See C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 19, at 135-36 & n.163 ("[The primary rights theory] is
not a workable test.").
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claims. In Takahashi v. Board of Trustees of Livingston,468 the plaintiff, a
female teacher of Japanese ancestry, filed successive claims for breach of
contract and emotional distress subsequent to dismissal from her teach-
ing position on grounds of alleged incompetence. 469 Takahashi instituted
a mandamus proceeding to compel the Commission who dismissed her to
set aside the decision. 470 The appellate court found that she had no right
to reinstatement, and petitions for further judicial review were denied.47'
After she exhausted these channels, she filed an action in federal court,
alleging that the school district had violated her rights to due process and
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution.47 She sought both compensatory damages for lost wages
and mental distress, and punitive damages.473  The school district
pleaded res judicata.474
Takahashi argued that under California's rules of res judicata,475
the first suit was based on the alleged violation of her "contractual right
to employment by the [school district], '4 76 while the second suit involved
her distinct primary right "to be treated in the same manner as a person
of non-Japanese ancestry" during the processes of teacher evaluation and
dismissal.47 7 The court rejected Takahashi's characterization, holding
that only the contractual right to employment was at stake.478 The court
stated that the harm suffered determines the number of primary rights
violated, and that the only harm she had suffered was the termination of
her teaching contract.4 79 The court did not believe that the mental dis-
tress she suffered from her dismissal constituted a separate injury. 480 In-
stead, the mental distress was a "consequence" of the school district's
468. 783 F.2d 848 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986) (applying California law).
469. Id. at 849.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id. Takahashi alleged that the school district: (1) terminated her on the basis of race;
(2) terminated her pursuant to impermissibly vague standards; and (3) evaluated her according
to different standards than those used to evaluate other teachers. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. The federal court applied California res judicata rules because a federal court must
give a state court judgment the same preclusive effect that the state court would give to that
judgment. Id. at 850 (citing Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81
(1984)).
476. Id. at 851.
477. Id.
478. Id. The court stated that "[c]ontractual rights are a species of primary rights." Id.
However, the court declined to give primary status to her discrimination claim, perhaps be-
cause she "failed to alleged [sic] a new injury." Id.
479. Id.
480. Id.
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termination of her contract, and consequential damages did not give rise
to a separate cause of action.481
As in Tooke v. Allen 48 2 and Holmes v. David Bricker, Inc.,as3 the
Takahashi court's conclusion was only arguably consistent with the pri-
mary rights theory. The court stated, in effect, that the body of the cause
of action was grounded in contract, and the emotional distress claim
which injured the plaintiff's person was an appendage in the form of
consequential damages.484 However, Takahashi alleged that she had suf-
fered economic harm from the breach of contract and injury to her per-
son as the result of discriminatory treatment a.4 8  The court's
interpretation of the right involved was broad, while the plaintiff's inter-
pretation was narrow. Both interpretations were consistent with the pri-
mary rights theory.486
D. Summary
In sum, Tooke, Holmes, and Takahashi illustrate how the primary
rights theory is easily manipulated. In Tooke, separate injuries caused by
the defendant's separate acts were subsumed under a continuous course
of conduct which violated the plaintiff's primary right to peaceful posses-
sion of her apartment,487 but the decision did not follow earlier cases
with similar facts.488 In Holmes, the plaintiffs' recovery in their second
suit was barred because they had pleaded breach of express warranty in
both suits, despite the fact that they had sustained separate injuries for
bodily injury and property damage.489 In Takahashi, the court disal-
lowed the second suit for emotional distress because it believed that the
emotional distress constituted merely consequential damages that were
part of her first claim grounded in contract, rather than a separate injury
481. Id.
482. 85 Cal. App. 2d 230, 192 P.2d 804 (1948). See supra notes 345-411 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Tooke.
483. 70 Cal. 2d 786, 452 P.2d 647, 76 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1969).
484. Takahashi, 783 F.2d at 851.
485. Id.
486. See C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 19, at 135-36.
487. Tooke v. Allen, 85 Cal. App. 2d 230, 236, 192 P.2d 804, 806 (1948). See supra notes
345-411 and accompanying text for a discussion of Tooke.
488. See, e.g., Lamb v. Harbaugh, 105 Cal. 680, 39 P. 56 (1895) (court found separate
causes of action for injuries to property, person, and character, rather than one cause of action
grounded in trespass); Ross v. Goins, 51 Cal. App. 412, 197 P. 132 (1921) (court dismissed
tenant's suit against landlord for unlawful removal from premises because tenant did not allege
separate causes of action for bodily injury, property damage, and conversion); see also Com-
ment, supra note 3, at 158-60. See also supra notes 380-406 and accompanying text.
489. Holmes v. David Bricker, Inc., 70 Cal. 2d 786, 790, 452 P.2d 647, 650, 76 Cal. Rptr.
431, 434.
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to her person.490
Due to the malleable nature of the primary rights theory, California
judges have been able to define a primary right so broadly that it encom-
passes the entire transaction giving rise to the plaintiff's claim. Courts
can thus avoid violating the primary rights theory and simultaneously
employ the same transaction criteria.
V. DOES CALIFORNIA STILL USE THE PRIMARY RIGHTS THEORY?
California may be shifting away from defining a cause of action in
terms of primary rights, 491 in favor of the same transaction definition.
492
Valid reasofis justify this shift. First, the primary rights theory is incon-
sistent with several aspects of California's current joinder procedure.
Second, the primary rights theory has been, and can be, applied in a way
that conflicts with California's policy of promoting judicial economy.
The shift is problematic primarily because no decision or rule has ac-
knowledged that the transition is occurring. However, despite the ab-
sence of official notice of the change, a plaintiff would be unwise to rely
on the opportunity to bring more than one suit.
A. Inconsistency with Current Joinder Provisions
Under California's compulsory cross-complaint statute,493 the de-
fendant must bring all cross -complaints that arise out of the same trans-
action as the plaintiff's claim in the first suit, or they are forfeited.494
Furthermore, if the defendant files a cross-complaint against the plaintiff,
the plaintiff must then assert any remaining claims he has against the
defendant, or waive them, if the claims arise out of the same transaction
as the defendant's cross -complaint.495 Yet, joinder of plaintiff's claims
490. Takahashi v. Board of Trustees, 783 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1182 (1986) (applying California law).
491. "California courts attempt to adhere to the Pomeroy Primary Rights theory that mul-
tiple causes of action can arise out of a single accident or occurrence." Hills & Pivnicka,
Development and Direction of the California Bad Faith Insurance Doctrine or "0 Ye of Little
Faith," 8 U.S.F. L. REv. 29, 43 n.62 (1973) (emphasis added). Hills and Pivnicka then cite
Holmes v. David Bricker, Inc., 70 Cal. 2d 786, 452 P.2d 657, 76 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1969), imply-
ing that California may not be succeeding in its "attempt." Id.
492. See supra note I 1 for the text of the same transaction definition proposed in the Re-
statement (Second) of Judgments.
493. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 426.10, 426.30 (West 1973).
494. Id.
495. Id. See supra notes 291-93 and accompanying text. "The original plaintiff may file a
cross-complaint to the defendant's cross-complaint ... and the compulsory cross-complaint
rule applies." 5 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 1098, at 518.
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remains merely permissive if no cross- complaint is filed. 96 Res judicata
may preclude a plaintiff from suing again, and the applicability of res
judicata turns on whether the claim omitted from the first suit is derived
from the same or a different primary right.4 97 By contrast, the test to
determine whether a defendant's omitted cross-complaint is barred by res
judicata is whether the claim arose from the same transaction or occur-
rence as the plaintiff's claim in the first suit.4 98
For example, suppose drivers P and D are involved in an auto acci-
dent, and both suffer bodily injury and property damage. Under the pri-
mary rights theory, P theoretically can file successive suits for bodily
injury and property damage.4 99 However, if D wishes to cross-complain
against P, D must include both of his claims in the same suit because
cross-complaints are compulsory if they arise out of the same transaction
or occurrence as P's claim."° Thus, if D's cross-complaint only alleges
personal injury, D's subsequent claim for property damage will be barred
by res judicata.5 0 However, if D files a cross-complaint that includes
either a property damage claim, or a personal injury claim, or both, then
P's formerly omitted property damage claim becomes compulsory be-
cause it arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as that which
gave rise to D's cross-complaint.50 2 Thus, different res judicata tests are
potentially applicable to P's two claims, and choosing the correct test
depends not on how many of each party's primary rights were violated,
but simply on whether D files a cross-complaint. This basis of choice
does not make sense.50 3
The inconsistency between the primary rights theory and Califor-
nia's current joinder provisions produces needless confusion, and elimi-
nation of such confusion would provide sufficient justification for
California to change its definition of a cause of action. However, the
continued use of the primary rights definition also conflicts with Califor-
nia's policy of judicial economy."° This conflict is so significant that the
primary rights definition may, in practice, be obsolete.
496. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427.10 (West 1973).
497. Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 954, 603 P.2d 58, 72, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 155
(1979).
498. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 426.10, 426.30 (West 1973).
499. Schermerhorn v. Los Angeles Pac. R.R. Co., 18 Cal. App. 454, 456, 123 P. 351, 352
(1912). See infra notes 523-27, 533-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the
option of bringing separate suits is essentially theoretical today.
500. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 426.10, 426.30 (West 1973).
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 5.
504. Id. at 13.
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B. Conflict with Judicial Economy
California has articulated a policy favoring judicial economy
through the rule against "splitting" causes of action.50 5 This policy is
further manifested by the legislature's revision of the joinder statutes to
avoid a multiplicity of suits.5"6 Many benefit from the resolution of mul-
tiple claims in a single suit.507 The plaintiff is spared the expense of a
second suit508 and collects all of the damages due at the close of one
proceeding. 09 The defendant also saves the costs that would be incurred
by having to defend a second suit, and is protected from repeated or
"vexatious" litigation over a single wrongful act. 10 The public is inter-
ested in the prudent allocation of increasingly scarce judicial re-
sources,511 and "[e]very dispute that is reheard means that another will
be delayed. '5 12 Judges thus have substantial motivation to promote judi-
cial economy.
Interpreting a primary right narrowly frustrates the goal of judicial
economy.51 3 Suppose an auto accident victim sustains both bodily injury
and property damage in the same accident. Traditionally, California has
found that two of the victim's primary rights would be violated: the
right to bodily security and the right to be free from injury to prop-
erty. 1 4 Plaintiff thus has two causes of action,51 5 and may bring two
505. See 4 B. WiTiN, supra note 1, § 34, at 76-77, and authorities cited therein.
506. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 426.10, 426.30, 427.10, 428.30 (West 1973). According
to the California Law Revision Commission:
The joinder categories created by [former] Section 427 are, for the most part,
arbitrary, are not based on reasons of practical convenience, and operate to defeat the
purpose of permitting joinder of causes in order to settle all conflicting claims be-
tween the parties in a single action. Elimination of the joinder categories and adop-
tion of an unlimited joinder rule would yield substantial benefits.
Recommendation, supra note 227, at 508-09. Although the California Law Revision Commis-
sion made this recommendation before the joinder rules were revised, the language contained
therein indicates the probability that the legislature was motivated, at least in part, by judicial
economy concerns. See supra notes 255-318 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
history ofjoinder in California.
507. M. KANE, supra note 6, § 14.3, at 615.
508. Comment, supra note 465, at 1414 n.31.
509. Id.
510. Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 Cal. 2d 891, 894, 151 P.2d 846, 848 (1944); M. KANE, supra
note 6, § 14.3, at 615.
511. M. KANE, supra note 6, § 14.3, at 615.
512. Id.
513. Professor Friedenthal noted that a broad cause of action is more conducive to judicial
economy than a narrow cause of action and that application of the primary rights definition
usually produces a narrower cause of action than that which would result under the applica-
tion of the same transaction definition. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 12-13.
514. 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 43.
515. Id.
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separate lawsuits for injuries sustained in the accident.5 16
However, if the plaintiff is deemed to have only one primary right-
the right to travel safely on the highway5 17 -then only one cause of ac-
tion exists.518 Under this broader interpretation, the plaintiff must assert
all claims arising from violation of the "right to travel safely on the high-
way" in a single lawsuit.519 The broad view of the primary right in this
example promotes judicial economy, while a narrow interpretation does
not. 520 However, the primary rights definition of a cause of action is
inherently ambiguous,521 and nothing within the primary rights defini-
tion requires that a right be defined broadly or narrowly.5 22 Thus, the
scope of a cause of action, and the resulting implementation of judicial
economy principles, is left to chance.
Although the benefits of judicial economy are widely recognized,
some commentators have expressed concern that measures designed to
promote procedural convenience may cut off substantive rights. 23 Res
judicata may punish the litigant for his attorney's mistakes,5 24 since the
516. Id. § 35, at 77.
517. The right could be broadened further: "Instead of two primary rights-a right to
personal security; a right to private property-why not a single one, a right not to be caused
loss by defendant's negligence?" C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 19, at 136 n.163.
See also supra notes 345-411 and accompanying text for a discussion of Tooke v. Allen, 85
Cal. App. 2d 230, 192 P.2d 804 (1948). In the Tooke case, the defendant attempted to charac-
terize plaintiff's rights narrowly, arguing that the causes of action resulting from violation of
the several rights at issue were either barred by statutes of limitations or too inconsequential to
show damages. Id. at 234-36, 192 P.2d at 808. The court, apparently moved by the plaintiff's
plight, found that the plaintiff had a broad right to quiet enjoyment of property which had
been violated by the defendant's continuous conduct. Id. at 236, 192 P.2d at 808-09.
518. Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 795, 543 P.2d 593, 594, 126 Cal. Rptr. 225, 226
(1975) (invasion of one primary right gives rise to one cause of action).
519. Id.
520. See supra note 513. Occasionally, cases are so complex that judicial efficiency is best
achieved by narrowing the number of issues to be considered in a single proceeding. Under
these circumstances, California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1048 gives the court discre-
tion to sever actions. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1048 (West Supp. 1989); Friedenthal, supra
note 15, at 5-6.
521. See supra notes 332-490 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ambiguity of
the primary rights theory.
522. C. CLARK, supra note 16, § 19, at 135-36 & n.163.
523. See, e.g., Schopflocher, What is a Single Cause of Action for the Purpose of the Doctrine
of Res Judicata?, 21 ORE. L. REv. 319, 321 (1942). Schopflocher stated:
[T]here is a strong policy not to cut off substantive rights of a litigant by a strict
application of the rules of procedure. "All procedure is merely a methodical means
whereby the court reaches out to restore rights and remedy wrongs; it must never
become more important than the purpose which it seeks to accomplish.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Clark v. Kirby, 243 N.Y. 295, 153 N.E. 79 (1926)).
524. Comment, supra note 10, at 414.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:351
litigant's claims will be barred for reasons apart from the merits.5 25
Thus, a narrow interpretation of a primary right might further justice
because it theoretically gives a plaintiff more opportunities to assert his
rights.
526
Even if the merits of this position are conceded, practical considera-
tions reveal its obsolescence. In earlier times, plaintiffs may have been
able to delay fling a second suit until the first suit was concluded, but
this option is largely illusory today. It could take years for the average
case to work its way through the California court system. By the time it
does so, it is quite possible that the statute of limitations will have run on
the omitted claims.527 Thus, although plaintiff's right to sue on a second
claim may not be cut off by res judicata, the opportunity for a second suit
could be eliminated by crowded court conditions. For this reason, the
advantages which may have flowed from a narrow definition of cause of
action for res judicata purposes have, to a significant extent, disappeared.
C. Other Concerns
As stated above, the primary rights theory and current joinder pro-
cedures are logically inconsistent,5 2 and the primary rights theory can
adversely affect judicial economy.5 29 However, a narrow definition of a
cause of action also frustrates the general aims of res judicata. The doc-
525. M. KANE, supra note 6, § 14.3, at 616.
526. See Schopflocher, supra note 523, at 363, for commentary favorable to a narrowly
circumscribed cause of action. According to Schopflocher, "the definition of a cause of action
for the purpose of resjudicata should be somewhere within the bounds of the individualized
concept of cause of action and, accordingly, should convey a more or less narrow concept."
Id.
527. For example, in California, a written contract action must be brought within four
years, a property damage action within three years, an oral contract action within two years
and a personal injury action within one year. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 337-39, 340.3 (West
1982 & Supp. 1989).
It is possible that the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act of 1986, codified at CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 68601-16 (West Supp. 1989), could restore the advantage of a narrow definition of a
cause of action. The Act enables the California Judicial Council to adopt "case disposition
time standards." Id. § 68603(a). In turn, the California Judicial Council adopted the case
disposition time standards recommended by the American Bar Association (ABA), effective
July 1, 1991. CAL. CIV. & CRIM. RULES, STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION REC-
OMMENDED BY THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, § 2.1(h) (West Supp. 1989). The ABA standards
provide that 90% of the civil suits filed in superior court must be resolved within 12 months,
98% within 18 months, and 100% within 24 months. STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT
DELAY REDUCTION § 2.52 (1984), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL JUDGES 11 (1984). Limited exceptions will be allowed. Id.
The courts, as opposed to the litigants and their attorneys, will control the pace of the suit. See
generally R.WEIL & I. BROWN, CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL, 1 12:4-53 (1989).
528. See supra notes 493-503 and accompanying text.
529. See supra notes 505-27 and accompanying text.
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trine of res judicata has two basic goals: protecting the defendant from
repeated litigation of the same matter, and bringing an end to litiga-
tion.530 A narrow definition of a cause of action potentially exposes the
defendant to multiple suits and undermines the finality of the judgment
in the first suit, thus diminishing the effectiveness of res judicata.531
Although California courts might interpret primary rights broadly, and
thereby further the goals of res judicata, such interpretation is far from
inevitable.532
Furthermore, due to ambiguity and inconsistent interpretation, reli-
ance on primary rights may be dangerous in modern practice. Although
Pomeroy's theory has received "flat acceptance" in California; "the
meaning of 'cause of action' remains elusive and subject to frequent dis-
pute and misconception .... , While joinder of plaintiff's claims is
theoretically permissive, "[t]he risks incurred by plaintiff in filing sepa-
rate actions are so substantial that it is almost never a good idea to do
so!"5 34 Even though a plaintiff may be confident that his claims consti-
tute separate causes of action, "a law and motion judge might rule other-
wise!",5 35 This could result from the judge's lack of understanding of the
primary rights theory, or from the theory's inherent ambiguity.536
The shortcomings of the primary rights theory are even more pro-
nounced when examined from the point of view of the actual litigant, as
opposed to the attorney. Attorneys make many decisions for their clients,
and the attorneys are charged with knowing the rules.537 However, the
plaintiff makes basic decisions such as whether or not to sue. If the rule
is that the number of causes of action is based upon the harm suffered, a
plaintiff who suffers personal injury and property damage caused by a
malfunctioning product under warranty could properly be expected to
understand that two distinct harms had been inflicted.538 However, to
expect the plaintiff to understand that two harms exist under a tort the-
530. M. KANE, supra note 6, § 14.3, at 615.
531. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 11.2.
532. See supra notes 513-22 and accompanying text.
533. 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 24, at 68.
534. R. WEIL & I. BROWN, supra note 527, 6:148.
535. Id., 6:149.
536. See supra notes 332-490 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ambiguity of
the primary rights theory.
537. Comment, supra note 10, at 414 ("Res judicata penalizes the client for the mistakes of
his attorney."). This problem is not unique to res judicata; it is generally presumed that the
attorney's knowledge of the law is greater than the client's. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 121, § 32, at 185-86. However, the accepted disparity in knowledge is not a good reason
to make the law more incomprehensible to lay people.
538. Similarly, an auto accident plaintiff in a same transaction jurisdiction could be ex-
pected to understand that the accident was a single "occurrence" and that he must bring all
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ory,5 3 9 but only one harm with two aspects of damage exists under a
breach of contract theory, 4° is asking too much from a lay plaintiff-and
may also be too much to ask of most attorneys and judges.
VI. CALIFORNIA SHOULD ABANDON PRIMARY RIGHTS
The primary rights definition of a cause of action for purposes of res
judicata is an anachronism. It has created confusion and inconsistency,
and fails to promote judicial economy. California should adopt another
method for determining whether multiple claims arising from the same
event may be brought in successive lawsuits. This could be accomplished
by amending the California Code of Civil Procedure to make joinder of
plaintiff's claims compulsory when they arise from the same transaction
or occurrence. Alternatively, California courts could overrule precedent
requiring adherence to the primary rights theory, adopting instead the
same transaction definition set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments54 1 and followed by the majority of jurisdictions.
542
A. Mandatory Joinder
The current statute governing joinder of plaintiff's claims5 43 could
be amended to be consistent with the provisions governing compulsory
cross-complaints. 54 Under the latter provisions, a party who has been
served with a complaint must allege any "related cause of action" in a
cross-complaint at the time the cross-complainant serves the answer.
5 45
If the "related cause of action" is not thus asserted, it is deemed
waived 46 A "related cause of action" is defined as one which "arises
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or oc-
currences" as the claim to which the cross-complaint is filed in re-
sponse.547 Under this approach, a plaintiff would be required to join all
claims arising from the same "occurrence" in the same lawsuit. See infra notes 566-88 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the same transaction definition of a cause of action.
539. Holmes v. David Bricker, Inc., 70 Cal. 2d 786, 788-89, 452 P.2d 647, 649, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 431, 433 (1969).
540. Id. at 789-90, 452 P.2d at 650, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
541. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, § 24.
542. Id. comment a; Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 12; Comment, supra note 11, at 368.
Most federal courts use the same transaction definition. lB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 1, 1 0.410[1], at 359-60.
543. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427.10 (West 1973). See supra notes 300-04 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of Section 427.10.
544. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 426.10-426.60 (West 1973).
545. Id. § 426.30(a).
546. Id.
547. Id. § 426.10(c).
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"related causes of action" in the original complaint.
Few jurisdictions have mandatory joinder-of-claims rules. 4 A
mandatory joinder-of-claims rule could motivate plaintiffs to litigate
claims that they might not otherwise have litigated, and this would inevi-
tably result in a more complicated lawsuit.54 9 Federal courts do not re-
quire joinder of plaintiff's claims, perhaps due to the apprehension that
flexibility will be sacrificed. 5 California considered mandatory joinder,
but the idea was rejected. 5
Nevertheless, several distinguished scholars favor mandatory join-
der. 2 A statute requiring mandatory joinder of plaintiff's claims arising
out of the same transaction or occurrence would eliminate the unpredict-
ability created by the ambiguity of the primary rights theory. 55 3 It would
also eliminate the inconsistency that exists with respect to joinder of
548. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 11 & n.45. Michigan is one jurisdiction that has a
mandatory joinder-of-claims rule. In that state:
the pleader must join every claim that the pleader has against that opposing party at
the time of serving the pleading, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the action and does not require for its adjudication the pres-
ence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
MICH. GEN. CT. RULE 2.203(A).
549. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 11-12.
550. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION § 4407, at 50-51 (1981) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
551. The California Law Revision Commission studied former California joinder provisions
and recommended changes. Recommendation, supra note 227. That study recommended
abolishing the separate classes of causes of action in the former joinder statute, Section 427 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure. Id. at 508-09. The Commission proposed
"[c]ompulsory joinder of related causes of action" which would have been codified at Section
426.20 of the California Code of Civil Procedure had that section been enacted. Id. at 545.
The proposed section read as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, if the plaintiff fails to allege in his complaint
a related cause of action which (at the time his complaint is filed) he has against any
party who is served or who appears in the action, all his rights against such party on
the related cause of action not pleaded shall be deemed waived and extinguished.
Id. The comment following the proposed statute observes that the requirement set forth
therein would produce the same results as those obtained in jurisdictions which define a cause
of action according to an "operative facts" (or same transaction) theory. Id. California, fol-
lowing the primary rights theory, allows a second suit if the second claim arising from the
same event violates a different primary right. Takahashi v. Board of Trustees, 783 F.2d 848,
851 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986) (applying California law); Recommendation,
supra note 227, at 545-46. However, the utility of the primary rights system is diminished by
the fact that "collateral estoppel [bars] an unpleaded cause of action if precisely the same
factual issues are involved in both actions." Id. at 546.
552. See, e.g., Blume, Required Joinder of Claims, 45 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1947);
Friedenthal, supra note 15; Schopflocher, supra note 523; see also works cited in WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 550, at 50 n.5.
553. The statutory approach to mandatory joinder technically would not change the pri-
mary rights definition of a cause of action to the same transaction definition. Instead, a statute
would render the primary rights definition superfluous.
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cross-complaints.5 a Nor would the California Legislature have to go to
the trouble of articulating which claims must be joined, since the criteria
established by the compulsory cross-complaint rule are already in
place. 5
Professor Friedenthal notes that the principal argument against
mandatory joinder is that "the rules of res judicata make it unneces-
sary."'556 However, Friedenthal points out that while this rationale is
valid in jurisdictions that define a cause of action for res judicata pur-
poses in terms of a transaction or occurrence, the same rationale may not
necessarily be valid in a primary rights jurisdiction.557 In a same transac-
tion or occurrence jurisdiction, the definition of a cause of action is rela-
tively broad. 5 8 The broad scope of a cause of action precludes most
subsequent suits, thereby forcing the plaintiff to litigate more claims in
one action.5 5 9 By contrast, under the primary rights theory, a cause of
action is generally narrower than it would be under the same transaction
theory.5 60 Thus, res judicata is less effective for encouraging joinder in
California than in same transaction jurisdictions.
56 1
Friedenthal favored a mandatory joinder statute for California if the
claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.5 62 The same
transaction or occurrence limitation would usually prevent a lawsuit
from becoming unduly complicated,5 6 and problems resulting from such
complications could be solved by severing causes for trial.5 64 Thus, the
anticipated problems that might result from requiring mandatory joinder
of claims which arise from the same transaction or occurrence could be
overcome without difficulty. A mandatory "transaction or occurrence"
554. See supra note 493-503 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inconsistency
between requirements governing permissive joinder of plaintiff's claims and requirements gov-
erning compulsory cross-complaints.
555. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 426.10, 426.30 (West 1973).
556. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 12.
557. Id. at 12-13.
558. Id. at 12.
559. Id. at 12-13. Professor Friedenthal stated:
The general uncertainty that invariably exists in such jurisdictions as to the precise
limits of a cause of action for res judicata purposes has sufficient in terrorem effect to
force plaintiffs to bring all related claims at once, even if ultimately some of those
claims might be considered separate causes.
Id.
560. Id. at 13.
561. Id.
562. Id. Professor Friedenthal also noted that as a practical matter, there will be only a
"small number of situations" where a plaintiff's multiple claims do not arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence. Id. at 6.
563. Id. at 12-13.
564. Id. at 5.
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joinder statute would solve many of the problems that result from basing
res judicata principles on primary rights.565
B. The Same Transaction or Occurrence Definition
In most jurisdictions, the scope of a cause of action is coterminous
with the transaction or occurrence that produces the resulting claims.5 66
The trend in federal courts is to employ the same transaction defini-
tion.567 The Restatement (Second) of Judgments (Restatement)568 pro-
poses that if a plaintiff's claim56 9 is deemed barred by res judicata, the
barred claim extinguishes all of the plaintiff's rights "to remedies against
the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series
of connected transactions out of which the [first] action arose.,
570
The comment accompanying the Restatement definition notes that
most jurisdictions characterize a cause of action as "coterminous with
the transaction" and evaluate it in "factual terms. '5 71 Under this ap-
proach, theories of recovery, types of relief sought, and primary rights
are irrelevant.572 "The transaction is the basis of the litigative unit...
which may not be split."
573
For purposes of res judicata, the same transaction definition has sev-
eral advantages over the primary rights definition. First, the same trans-
action definition is much easier to understand. Lay persons and lawyers
alike can be expected to have a fairly good idea of what a "transaction"
565. An extensive comparison between the relative merits of a compulsory joinder statute
and those of a judicial principle that would control the application of res judicata is beyond the
scope of this Comment. However, a statute would arguably provide more certainty than a
judge-made doctrine. See Schopflocher, supra note 523, at 364 ("[I]t seems in the interest of a
clear legal analysis to know precisely where the realm of judicial discretion begins and the
automatic operation of a rule of law terminates.").
566. "[T]he majority of states ... follow the so called 'operative facts' theory of a cause of
action; under this theory the scope of a single cause of action is held broad enough to cover all
claims arising from a single set of transactions or occurrences." Friedenthal, supra note 15, at
12.
567. 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, 1 0.410[l], at 359.
568. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, § 24.
569. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
avoid the term "cause of action," and instead use the term "claim" to denote the same litiga-
tive unit that California calls a "cause of action." lB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 1, at 361. The two terms have been used interchangeably. See, e.g., WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 550, § 4407, at 48. See also supra note 1.
570. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note I1, § 24(l). See supra note 11
for the text of the definition of a cause of action proposed in the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments.
571. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, § 24 comment a.
572. Id.
573. Id.
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or "occurrence" is,574 whereas it can be difficult to predict what a "pri-
mary fight" will be in many cases. 575 Although we could expect disputes
over whether a series of events constitutes a single "transaction" or "oc-
currence," '576 the disputes can be resolved by employing objective criteria
such as the closeness of the events in time and space. 577 By contrast, no
objective method exists to determine whether single or multiple primary
rights have been violated, because the concept of primary rights is inher-
ently ambiguous.
578
The second advantage of the "same transaction" definition is that it
promotes judicial economy. Primary fights are frequently narrower than
the transaction which gives rise to the claim.57 9 Thus, a single "occur-
rence" can give rise to multiple causes of action under the primary rights
theory,580 thereby allowing the plaintiff to file successive suits.58 ' This
wastes judicial resources,5 82 particularly when both actions require the
same evidence, witnesses, and the like.583 By contrast, if the transaction
is the litigation unit, the plaintiff is forced to litigate more claims in a
single lawsuit, thereby reducing the number of lawsuits and promoting
judicial economy.
584
Third, since the same transaction definition is used in federal
574. "[A] lay or nonlegal grouping of the facts into a single unit, as nonprofessional wit-
nesses would naturally do, will be the most practicable [definition of a cause of action]." C.
CLARK, supra note 16, § 19, at 137.
575. See supra notes 332-490 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inherent ambi-
guity of the primary rights theory.
576. Lasa Per L'Industria del Marno Soc. Per Azioni of Lasa, Italy v. Alexander, 414 F.2d
143 (6th Cir. 1969) illustrated the kind of dispute that can arise over the extent of a single
"transaction or occurrence." That complex case involved an initial claim, a series of counter-
claims and cross-claims, and a third-party complaint. Id. at 145. At issue was whether two of
the cross-claims and the third-party claim "[arose] out of the same transaction or occurrence
that [was] the subject matter of the original action" as required by Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 13(g) and (hi). Id. The majority gave "[t]he words 'transaction or occurrence'.., a
broad and liberal interpretation in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits." Id. at 147.
By contrast, the dissenting judge thought that the cross-claims were not part of the same
transaction as the original claim, since he thought that they were "not related to the original
claim ... and that there [was] no identity of the many factual issues involved ...." Id. at 151
(McAllister, J., dissenting).
577. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, § 24(2) & comment b.
578. See supra notes 332-490 and accompanying text.
579. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 13.
580. Id.; 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 43.
581. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 13.
582. The problem is more theoretical than actual today because the plaintiff has other rea-
sons to bring all of his claims in one suit. See supra notes 507-12, 527, 533-36 and accompany-
ing text.
583. Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 12.
584. 1B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, 0.410[2].
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courts,5"' it would be easier for California practitioners and federal
judges if all courts in California employed a uniform definition of a cause
of action. Additionally, California's current joinder-of-causes statute586
is very similar to the comparable federal provision;587 both allow unlim-
ited joinder of claims."' s California has no defensible reason for using a
different standard for claim preclusion.
The California Supreme Court could change the state's definition of
a cause of action by simply overruling precedent.5 9 In place of the pri-
mary rights theory, California could use either the Restatement defini-
tion5 9° or California's own "transaction" requirement set forth in the
compulsory cross-complaint provisions. 9 ' Either option would make
California's definition of a cause of action more modern, comprehensible,
certain, and efficient than it is now.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the past, the primary rights definition of a cause of action for
purposes of res judicata made more sense than it does today. At com-
mon law, "forms of action" determined the limitations on pleading,
amendment, and joinder, and these limitations were aimed at producing
a single issue for trial. Joinder limitations were particularly significant.
At common law, a plaintiff could not join claims unless they fell within
the same "form of action." Under the original code, the joinder statute
prohibited a plaintiff from joining causes of action unless they fell within
specific classes. Thus, the plaintiff was often prevented from joining all
of his claims arising from the same transaction. Under these conditions,
it would have been unfair to disallow separate suits on each claim.
However, California now allows unlimited joinder of plaintiff's
claims without any category-based limitations. Therefore, the fairness
585. Id. 1 0.410[I], at 359.
586. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427.10 (West 1973).
587. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
588. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427.10 (West 1973); FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
589. Ohio switched from the primary rights definition to the same transaction definition by
overruling precedent. See Rush v. City of Maple Heights, 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N.E.2d 599,
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 814 (1958). The California Supreme Court is likewise able to overrule
precedent. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 296-97, 758 P.2d 58,
62-63, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 121 (1988). California could easily follow Ohio's example.
590. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, § 24; see supra note 11 for
the text of Section 24 and notes 568-73 for a discussion thereof.
591. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 426.10, 426.30 (West 1973). See supra notes 305-07, 493-
503 and accompanying text for a discussion of California's compulsory cross-complaint
requirements.
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considerations that formerly supported a narrow definition of a cause of
action are no longer applicable.
Additionally, the combination of crowded court conditions and stat-
utes of limitations has eliminated any advantage the plaintiff might have
obtained from filing separate suits. It could take several years for a case
to move through the California court system, and when the first suit is
concluded, the statute of limitations has often run on the second claim.
Thus, the opportunity for the plaintiff to bring more than one suit on
claims arising from the same occurrence are today more theoretical than
real.
The primary rights theory has other disadvantages. The concept of
a "primary right" is inherently ambiguous, and, therefore, in any given
case, the right at issue can be given a broad or narrow interpretation.
The ambiguity causes uncertainty and confusion. Additionally, the pri-
mary rights definition is less conducive to judicial economy than the
same transaction definition; unless the primary right at issue is defined
broadly enough to encompass the entire occurrence that gave rise to the
claims, several suits will be permitted when a single suit could resolve the
entire controversy. Furthermore, most jurisdictions, including the fed-
eral courts, employ the same transaction definition of a cause of action as
opposed to the primary rights definition. The minority position is not by
definition the inferior position. However, the same transaction definition
has the distinct advantages of being easier to understand and more con-
ducive to judicial economy. By contrast, the advantages of the primary
rights definition have become extinct or illusory.
For these reasons, California should abandon the primary rights
definition of a cause of action. In its place, California should require
mandatory joinder of plaintiff's claims by statute if the claims arise out
of the same transaction or occurrence. Alternatively, California courts
should adopt the same transaction definition by overruling the precedent
that keeps the primary rights definition operative. Either way, the pri-
mary rights theory would be relegated to its rightful place in history,
where it belongs.
Robin James*
* The author wishes to thank Professor Christopher May for introducing the author to
the subject of primary rights and for reading a draft of this Comment, and primary editor
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